Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment

June 2015



Image source: Toronto Hydro

AECOM Environment

Clean Air Partnership
75 Elizabeth Street
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 1P4

Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment

Application of the Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Assessment Protocol to Electrical Distribution Infrastructure

Final Report - Public

6031-8907

June 2015

© AECOM All rights reserved.

Toronto Hydro Legal Disclaimer

The information in these materials is based on information currently available to Toronto Hydro Corporation and its affiliates (together hereinafter referred to as “Toronto Hydro”), and is provided for information purposes only. Toronto Hydro does not warrant the accuracy, reliability, completeness or timeliness of the information and undertakes no obligation to revise or update these materials. Toronto Hydro (including its directors, officers, employees, agents and subcontractors) hereby waives any and all liability for damages of whatever kind and nature which may occur or be suffered as a result of the use of these materials or reliance on the information therein. These materials may also contain forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws in Canada ("Forward-Looking Information"). The purpose of the Forward-Looking Information is to provide Toronto Hydro’s expectations about future results of operations, performance, business prospects and opportunities and may not be appropriate for other purposes. All Forward-Looking Information is given pursuant to the "safe harbour" provisions of applicable Canadian securities legislation. The words "anticipates", "believes", "budgets", "could", "estimates", "expects", "forecasts", "intends", "may", "might", "plans", "projects", "schedule", "should", "will", "would" and similar expressions are often intended to identify Forward-Looking Information, although not all Forward-Looking Information contains these identifying words. The Forward-Looking Information reflects the current beliefs of, and is based on information currently available to, Toronto Hydro’s management. The Forward-Looking Information in these materials includes, but is not limited to, statements regarding Toronto Hydro’s future results of operations, performance, business prospects and opportunities. The statements that make up the Forward-Looking Information are based on assumptions that include, but are not limited to, the future course of the economy and financial markets, the receipt of applicable regulatory approvals and requested rate orders, the receipt of favourable judgments, the level of interest rates, Toronto Hydro’s ability to borrow, and the fair market value of Toronto Hydro’s investments. The Forward-Looking Information is subject to risks, uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from historical results or results anticipated by the Forward-Looking Information. The factors which could cause results or events to differ from current expectations include, but are not limited to, the timing and amount of future cash flows generated by Toronto Hydro's investments, market liquidity and the quality of the underlying assets and financial instruments, the timing and extent of changes in prevailing interest rates, inflation levels, legislative, judicial and regulatory developments that could affect revenues, and the results of borrowing efforts. Toronto Hydro cautions that this list of factors is not exclusive. All Forward-Looking Information in these materials is qualified in its entirety by the above cautionary statements and, except as required by law, Toronto Hydro undertakes no obligation to revise or update any Forward-Looking Information as a result of new information, future events or otherwise after the date hereof.

Statement of Qualifications and Limitations

The following Document (the "Document") has been prepared by AECOM Consultants Inc. ("Consultant") in accordance with the agreement between Consultant and Clean Air Partnership, including the scope of work detailed therein (the "Agreement").

The information, data, recommendations and conclusions contained in the Document (collectively, the "Information"):

- is subject to the scope, schedule, and other constraints and limitations in the Agreement and the qualifications contained in the Document (the "Limitations");
- represents Consultant's professional judgement in light of the Limitations and industry standards for the preparation of similar reports;
- may be based on information provided to Consultant which has not been independently verified;
- has not been updated since the date of issuance of the Document and its accuracy is limited to the time period and circumstances in which it was collected, processed, made or issued;
- must be read as a whole and sections thereof should not be read out of such context; and,
- was prepared for the specific purposes described in the Document and the Agreement;

Consultant accepts no responsibility for any events or circumstances that may have occurred since the date on which the Document was prepared.

Consultant has exercised reasonable care when completing the Document. However, caution must be taken when considering the Information contained within because significant uncertainty remains due to the inherent complexities involved in analysing the past climate and variables typically encountered when modelling future climate change, as well as changing conditions beyond Consultant's control. Consultant cannot guarantee the accuracy of the climate observations and projections described in the Document that are largely based on prior work by others. Consultant agrees that the Information in the Document, developed based on those climate observations and projections, represents its professional judgement as described above and that the Information has been prepared for the specific purpose and use described in the Document and the Agreement, but Consultant makes no other representations, or any guarantees or warranties whatsoever, whether express or implied, with respect to the Document, the Information or any part thereof.

This Statement of Qualifications and Limitations is attached to and forms part of the Document and any use of the Document is subject to the terms hereof.

Distribution List

No. of printed copies	PDF required	Organization
-	1	Toronto Hydro
	1	Clean Air Partnership
	1	Natural Resources Canada
	1	Risk Sciences International

Revisions List

Revision #	Revised by	Date	Description of the revisions
1	AECOM	8 May 2015	Response to Toronto Hydro comments on Preliminary Report
2	AECOM	29 May 2015	Response to Toronto Hydro comments on Final Report

Signatures

Report prepared by: Sophie Potvin-Champagne, Eng. 1 June 2015

Climate Information prepared by: Simon Eng, Risk Sciences International
Heather Auld, Risk Sciences International
Neil Comer, Risk Sciences International

Report verified by: 1 June 2015
Chee F. Chan, Urban Planner, MUP, B. Sc.

Executive Summary

The current study aims to evaluate the vulnerability of Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system within the City of Toronto to a changing climate by employing Engineers Canada's Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Assessment Protocol (PIEVC Protocol). This study is a high level screening analysis designed to determine where infrastructure vulnerabilities to climate change may be present, to suggest avenues for adapting infrastructure to climate change, and to identify areas of further study.

Electrical Distribution System under Study

Toronto Hydro distributes electricity across the City of Toronto, Canada's largest city and home to approximately 2.8 million people in 2014. Toronto Hydro serves approximately 740,000 customers in the City of Toronto and owns approximately $3 billion dollars in assets, including over 170 transformer stations, approximately 29,000 km of overhead and underground wires, 20,000+ switches, 60,000+ transformers and 176,000+ poles.

The study period of this assessment was 2015 to 2050. A "system" level approach was employed to assess the impacts of climate change on the various parts of the electrical distribution system. This approach divided the distribution system into six major asset categories: stations, feeders, communications systems, civil structures, auxiliary mechanical systems and human resources. Asset categories were assessed based on their general characteristics (e.g. typical, representative or common electrical or mechanical configurations, standards, equipment). For example, this analysis focused on how systems designed to current (post 2000) CSA standards may interact with the climate parameters being considered. Changes to the electrical system considered in this assessment included the planned transition from rear lot to front lot power lines, the partial phase out of 4.16 kV system, some demand and supply projections[1], and replacement of non-submersible equipment. The streetlighting system and systems serving the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) were not within the scope of this study.

Toronto Hydro documentation, electrical standards and consultations with Toronto Hydro staff (through ongoing communications and two workshops) were all used to help identify and describe asset categories, general characteristics and sensitivities to climate related stresses (climate parameters[2]).

Climate Parameters

20 climate parameters including high temperature, heavy rainfall, snowfall, freezing rain, high winds and lightning were considered in this assessment. Relevant climate parameters and threshold values at which infrastructure performance would be affected were identified through a literature review, consultations with Toronto Hydro staff and analysis of past outage events.

The probability of a climate parameter occurring during the study period was determined using global climate modelling (GCM) data obtained from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 5th Assessment Report (IPCC AR5). In many cases, this information was validated or refined through the use of regional climate modelling data, statistical downscaling and climate analogues.

The probability of a climate parameter occurring is expressed both as a study period probability value (i.e. what is the probability of a climate parameter occurring sometime between 2015 – 2050) and an annual probability value centred around the 2030's and 2050's (i.e. what is the annual probability of a climate parameter occurring around

[1] It should be noted that city-wide land use changes (high rises, condo development and population growth) were not included in the analysis, due to the scope of such an undertaking and the complexity of information required. Vulnerabilities were determined based on the assumption that gradual population growth would generally be accommodated by corresponding growth of Toronto Hydro systems under business as usual practices without the added stress of climate change.

[2] A climate parameter is defined by the PIEVC Protocol as a specific set of weather conditions or climate trends deemed to be relevant to the infrastructure under consideration. The parameter may be a single variable, such as mean monthly temperature, or a combination of variables, such as low temperature combined with rainfall.

the 2030's and 2050's). Examining both annual and study period probability was useful for understanding vulnerabilities that may stem from events which could occur on an annual basis (e.g. high temperature) against those which could occur less than annually, but have the potential to cause significant damage to the system sometime during the 35 year study period (e.g. ice storms, high winds, tornadoes). The list of climate parameters considered in this study is shown in table ES-1.

Table ES-1 Climate Parameters and Probability of Occurrence

Climate Parameter		Annual Probability (Historical; **Projected 2030's and *2050's***)	Probability of Occurrence Study Period (2015-2050)
Daily Maximum Temperatures	25°C	66 per year; **84 per year**, ***106 per year***	100%
	30°C	16 per year; **26 per year**, ***47 per year***	100%
	35°C	0.75 per year; **3 per year**, ***8 per year***	100%
	40°C	~0.01 per year; **0.3 to 2 days per year, *1-7 days per year***	~100%
High Daily Avg. Temperature	30°C	0.07 per year; **N/A, *1.2 days per year***	~100%
Heat Wave	3 days max temp over 30°C	0.88 per year; **>1 for both**	100%
High Nighttime Temperatures	Nighttime low ≥23°C	0.70 per year; **7 per year, *16 per year***	~100%
Extreme Rainfall	100 mm in <1 day + antecedent	0.04 per year; ***extreme precipitation expected ↑, percentage unknown***	~75%-85%
Ice Storm/Freezing Rain	15 mm (tree branches)	0.11 per year; **>0.13 per year, *>0.16 per year***	>99%
	25 mm ≈ 12.5 mm radial	0.06 days per year; **>0.07 per year, *>0.09 per year***	>95%
	60 mm ≈ 30 mm radial	Upper bound of estimate: 0.007 events per year; **>0.008 per year; *>0.01 per year*** Lower bound of estimate: 0.002 events per year; **> 0.0023 per year; *0.003 per year***	High: ~25% Low: ~8%
High Winds	70 km/h+ (tree branches)	21 days per year**; N/A, *24 to 26 per year***	100%
	90 km/h	2 days per year; **N/A, *>2.5 per year***	100%
	120 km/h	~0.05 days per year; ***likely ↑, but % unknown***	~85% or higher
Tornado	EF1+	1-in-6,000; ***Unknown, no consensus***	~0.6%
	EF2+	1-in-12,000; ***Unknown, no consensus***	~0.3%
Lightning	Flash density per km km^2	1.12 to 2.24 per year per km^2; ***Expected increase, % change unknown***	~50-70%(Lg); ~10-20% (Sm)
Snowfall	Days w/ >10 cm	1.5 days per year; ***Trend decreasing but highly variable***	100%
	Days w/ > 5cm	5 days per year; ***Trend decreasing but highly variable***	100%
Frost		229 frost free days; **249 frost free days, *273 frost free days***	100%

Assessing Vulnerability

The vulnerability of the electrical system to climate parameters was determined using a risk based framework (probability of occurrence of a climate parameter coupled with the severity/consequence of the impact on the system). All high risk interactions were deemed as vulnerabilities for Toronto Hydro. Medium risk interactions were evaluated in further detail through an engineering analysis. Those which exhibited sensitivities or consequences similar to high risk interactions were also deemed as vulnerabilities for Toronto Hydro. Finally, interactions rated as low risk were generally judged as not being a significant issue or vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

A mapping of the risk ratings was also completed as part of this study and represents a useful first approximation of spatial nature of climate change vulnerabilities to the electrical system. The mapping exercise provides additional information on how vulnerabilities stemming from stations can combine with vulnerabilities to feeder systems. In some cases, vulnerabilities stem primarily from station assets, while in other cases, both station and feeder vulnerabilities to weather events contribute to an area of greater vulnerability within the city. This mapping information can be easily combined with other layers of information such as technical hazard information (e.g. flood mapping), critical building and infrastructure locations (e.g. emergency resource centres, hospitals, transportation networks) and social vulnerability indices (e.g. age, income, population density, etc.) from other sources (e.g. TRCA, City of Toronto) to support further mapping studies and in depth analyses.

Figure ES-1 Example Maps Based on Risk Ratings for High Heat, Freezing Rain and Lightning

High Ambient Temperatures



Freezing Rain



Lightning



This study found that distribution system vulnerabilities to a changing climate were divided into five groups based on how climate parameters affect the system.

High Ambient Temperatures – Station and Feeder Assets

High ambient temperatures create problems for the distribution system because of the compounding effect of high demand (e.g. for cooling) and high ambient temperature affecting power transformer capacity and electrical transmission efficiency. Two climate parameters were of most significant concern, daily maximum temperatures exceeding 40°C (excluding humidity) and daily average temperatures exceeding 30°C. For these climate parameters, the analysis found that such extreme temperatures have occurred rarely in the past, but are projected to occur almost semi-annually by the 2030's, and annually by the 2050's. It is anticipated that vulnerability to high heat events will be concentrated in the Former Toronto area, although there are several horseshoe station service areas which would also be vulnerable.

Freezing Rain, Ice Storms, High Wind and Tornadoes – Overhead Station and Feeder Assets

Freezing rain, ice storms, high wind and tornado events can cause immediate structural issues for overhead station and feeder assets, as they have the capacity to exceed the design limits of equipment and their supports. Outages may result from damage to equipment arising from direct forces applied by climate parameters (e.g. wind, ice weight) or by other objects (e.g. tree branches, flying debris). Toronto Hydro has experienced problems related to freezing rain, ice storms (up to 25 mm) and high winds (up to 90 km/h) in the past. These events are projected to continue in the future, but continue to occur on a less than annual, or even decadal frequency. Nonetheless, the damages caused by these kinds of events can be severe, and mostly affect outdoor station and feeder assets, much of which is concentrated in the horseshoe service area.

Extreme Rainfall – Underground Feeder Assets

Extreme rainfall events may potentially flood underground feeder assets. These vulnerabilities are largely concentrated in the Former Toronto and northeastern horseshoe areas. Toronto Hydro is aware of these issues in relation to its assets and has programs to replace non-submersible equipment with submersible type equipment, to relocate equipment where possible. However, due to the large quantity of underground feeder assets across the city, replacement and reinforcement of underground assets will be a gradual and ongoing activity for Toronto Hydro over the study period. As such, some underground feeder assets may remain an area of vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

Snowfall, Freezing Rain - Corrosion of Civil Structures

The degradation of civil structures (i.e. concrete and steel), which is accelerated by humidity and the presence of de-icing salts, was identified as a potential area of vulnerability to climate change. Corrosion is already an ongoing issue for Toronto Hydro. As such, current assets have a design lifespan which accounts to a great extent for corrosion issues. However, it is not clear from this study whether the climate change stresses will exacerbate this problem. While snowfall days are generally expected to decrease with a warming climate, they will continue to occur annually through to the 2050's. As a result, and in combination with freezing rain events, de-icing salts will also be applied annually through the study horizon, and corrosion will continue to be an ongoing preoccupation. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that corrosion represents a long-term and on-going vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

Lightning – Overhead Feeder Assets

Based on workshop feedback and an examination of Toronto Hydro's interruption tracking system's (ITIS) outage data, Toronto Hydro recognizes that lightning impacts are a significant source of outages on the distribution system today. While there have been advances in predicting lightning activity, there was insufficient data available on lightning strike intensity and arrester performance to suggest how future lighting activity may affect the electrical system. For these reasons, this study suggests that lightning strikes will continue to be an area of vulnerability.

Adaptation Options and Areas of Further Study

This study provides high level adaptation options under the themes of engineering actions, management actions, monitoring activities and further study. Generally, for high heat related climate parameters, Toronto Hydro could further investigate avenues to enhance the system's capacity to deal with higher demand under high temperature conditions, especially since extreme heat events are projected to occur on a semi-annual to annual basis by the 2030's and 2050's. On climate events causing structural damage issues (i.e. freezing rain, ice storms, high winds and tornadoes), adaptation options include optimizing emergency response and service restoration, as well as infrastructure hardening and burying infrastructure. While the latter engineering-type solutions are relatively capital intensive, asset renewal cycles provide excellent opportunities to consider these types of upgrades. This study also recommends that Toronto Hydro continue monitoring the occurrences and impacts of major freezing rain, high wind and tornado events on the system, as well as the science of climate change projections. This multi-faceted approach provides Toronto Hydro with greater flexibility in managing vulnerabilities related to these types of extreme climate events.

Other potential options to address identified vulnerabilities include continued monitoring and evaluation of climate change projection science, monitoring impacts of a changing climate on certain asset classes, evaluating the need to strengthen or defend certain infrastructure and equipment from climate parameters, and enhancing emergency response and service restoration practices.

Acknowledgements

This study was completed with support from Natural Resources Canada. It was produced through its Adaptation Platform Electrical Sector Working Group[3]. AECOM would also like to acknowledge Engineers Canada for the technical support, participation and for the use of its Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Committee (PIEVC) Protocol. The Toronto region's WeatherWise Partnership is also acknowledged for its work on bringing the issue of climate related threats on electrical infrastructure to the forefront, and for its support in bringing about this study. AECOM would like to thank the Clean Air Partnership for the opportunity to undertake this study.

AECOM would also like to acknowledge Toronto Hydro staff for their time and effort in providing information about their system, participating in workshops and meetings, providing insight into the functionality of their system, and reviewing documents and reports. Without their valuable contributions, this study could not have proceeded.

[3] For more information on climate change impacts and adaptation, please visit adaptation.nrcan.gc.ca" (or for French language publications/sites: "adaptation.rncan.gc.ca").

Table of Contents

1 Study Context 1

1.1 Introduction and Mandate 1

1.2 Methodology and Approach 1

1.3 Structure of this Report 2

2 Description of the Infrastructure 3

2.1 Study Area 3

2.2 General System Overview 5

2.3 Substations 7

2.4 Feeder Systems 10

2.5 Communications Systems 13

2.6 Civil Structures 14

2.7 Auxiliary mechanical 15

2.8 Human Resources 15

2.9 Time Horizon 15

2.10 Other Potential Changes that May Affect Infrastructure 16

2.11 Data Sufficiency 17

3 Assessment of Climate Changes 19

3.1 Climate Data Development Methodology 19

3.2 Summary of Results 22

3.3 Data Sufficiency and Recommendations 23

4 Vulnerability Assessment Methodology 25

4.1 Risk Tolerance Thresholds 25

4.2 Yes/No Analysis 25

4.3 Infrastructure Performance Responses - Systems Level Approach 25

4.4 Scoring Severity 28

4.5 Mapping Risks 29

5 Assessment Results 31

5.1 Low Risk Interactions 31

5.2 Medium Risk Interactions 32

5.3 High Risk Interactions 34

5.4 Special Cases – High Severity, Low Probability Events 36

5.6 Special Cases – Low Severity, High Probability Events 37

5.7 Mapping Risk Results 37

6 Engineering Analysis 43
6.1 Municipal and Transmission Stations and Communications Systems 44
6.2 Underground and Overhead Feeders 44
6.3 Civil Structures 46
6.4 Human Resources 47
7 Conclusions 49
7.1 Vulnerabilities to a Changing Climate 49
7.2 Adaptation Options 50
7.3 Other Areas of Study 53
8 Bibliography 55

List of Tables

Table 2-1 Transmission Stations and Service Areas 8
Table 2-2 Load Projections by Transmission Station 17
Table 3-1 PIEVC Version 10 Probability Scores based on Method B 22
Table 3-2 Climate Parameters and Thresholds, Occurrence Probabilities and PIEVC Scoring 22
Table 4-1 Risk Tolerance Thresholds 25
Table 4-2 Severity Rating Based on Station Capacity by the 2050's 27
Table 4-3 Severity Rating Based on Feeder Configuration 28
Table 4-4 Severity Scoring Scale for Electrical Distribution Systems 29
Table 6-1 Engineering Analysis Results 43
Table 7-1 Vulnerabilities and Adaptation Options by Infrastructure Asset, Climate Parameter 50

List of Figures

Figure 2-1 Major System Categories Under Study 4
Figure 2-2 City of Toronto Study Area 4
Figure 2-3 Typical Electric Power System 6
Figure 2-4 Transmission Stations 7
Figure 2-5 The Station Yard at Cavanagh Transmission Station 9
Figure 2-6 Residential Area MS (front and rear views) 10
Figure 2-7 Location of Feeders, by Type 12
Figure 5-1 Risk Map, High Temperature Above 40°C, 2050's 38
Figure 5-2 Risk Map, Extreme Rainfall, 100 mm in less than 24h, 2050's 38

Figure 5-3 Risk Map, 25 mm Freezing Rain, 2050's.....39
Figure 5-4 Risk Map, Electrical Distribution Systems Potentially Affected by Lightning Strikes 40

Appendices

Appendix A Workshop Presentations
Appendix B Background Information on Developing Climate Data
Appendix C Forensic Analysis of Weather Related Power Outage Events
Appendix D Risk Assessment Matrix
Appendix E Risk Maps
Appendix F Load Projection Methodology – Toronto Hydro
Appendix G Engineering Analysis
Appendix H PIEVC Worksheets

List of Acronyms

CAP	Clean Air Partnership
GCM	Global climate model
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HONI	Hydro One Networks Inc.
ITIS	Interruption Tracking System
NRCan	Natural Resources Canada
OPG	Ontario Power Generation
PIEVC	Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Committee
Protocol	The climate change based public infrastructure vulnerability assessment developed by the PIEVC and Engineers Canada
RCM	Regional climate model
RCP	Representative concentration pathway
RSI	Risk Sciences International
THESL	Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited
TTC	Toronto Transit Commission

1 Study Context

1.1 Introduction and Mandate

In 2012, Engineers Canada partnered with the Clean Air Partnership (CAP) and Toronto Hydro to evaluate the risks of climate change on Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution infrastructure in the City of Toronto. At that time, CAP mandated AECOM and Risk Sciences International (RSI) to undertake a Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Assessment Protocol (PIEVC Protocol, or the Protocol)[4] based study on select components of Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system to historical climate. That study, named the Toronto Hydro-Electric System PIEVC Pilot Case (pilot case study), was meant to demonstrate the applicability of the Protocol to electrical systems. The pilot case study was also envisioned as the first of a two-phase project to assess climate change related vulnerabilities to electrical systems. The pilot case study was completed at the end of summer 2012 (AECOM and RSI, 2012).

In summer 2013, CAP and Toronto Hydro elected to pursue the second phase of the climate change assessment with support from Natural Resources Canada's (NRCan) "Enhancing Competitiveness in a Changing Climate" program. NRCan's program is designed to facilitate the development and sharing of knowledge, tools and practices which assist decision-makers in the analysis and implementation of climate change related adaptation measures. CAP, once again mandated AECOM and RSI to carry out the Phase 2 climate change vulnerability assessment (Phase 2 study). The Phase 2 study is the subject of the current report.

1.2 Methodology and Approach

The Phase 2 study again employs the Protocol as the framework for the climate change analysis. The Protocol is composed of five steps:

- Step 1 – Project Definition;
- Step 2 – Data Gathering and Sufficiency;
- Step 3 – Risk Assessment;
- Step 4 – Engineering Analysis;
- Step 5 – Recommendations and Conclusions.

In contrast to the pilot case study, the scope of Phase 2 study was extended to include most of Toronto Hydro owned electrical distribution infrastructure and civil support structures across the City of Toronto. Toronto Hydro's streetlighting system and electrical systems for the Toronto Transit Commission were not within the scope of the present study. Anticipated climate changes and impacts at the 2030 and 2050 time horizons were evaluated. Most of the activities prescribed by the Protocol were completed as part of Phase 2 with the exception of a site visit. The triple-bottom line adaptation solutions development module, an optional undertaking in the PIEVC Protocol, was also not completed as part of Phase 2 of this study[5].

As part of the activities of Phase 2, two workshops were held with Toronto Hydro staff. The first workshop was held on July 3, 2014 in Toronto Hydro's offices in Toronto. At this workshop, an overview of the infrastructure and climate components (Steps 1 and 2 of the Protocol), were presented for discussion and validation with Toronto Hydro staff. On October 10, 2014, a second workshop was held to validate the risk assessment completed by AECOM and RSI (Step 3 of the Protocol).

[4] The Protocol is a structured and documented methodology for a screening level assessment of infrastructure vulnerability to a changing climate, and for developing adaptation solutions to identified vulnerabilities. The Protocol, currently in version 10, also allows users to evaluate the vulnerabilities stemming from current climate to the infrastructure as part of the overall assessment.

[5] The triple-bottom line adaptation solutions development module guides users in the development and screening of potential solutions to address the impacts of climate change identified in the preceding steps of the Protocol. It was not in the scope of the current study.

The components of the electrical distribution system (e.g. stations, power lines, transformers, switches, supports) under study are highly interdependent, and failures in one part of the system may result in interrelated structural, electrical or functional issues in other portions of the system (e.g. failures in poles may bring down power line and transformers, electrical faults may cause the system to lose protection, control or redundancy). For this reason, the study of electrical systems cannot be examined solely on the basis of its individual pieces or classes or equipment. This study adopts a *systems level approach*[6] to examining the climate change risks to the extensive, complex and interdependent components of Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system. This approach divides the electrical distribution system into six major systems categories encompassing different individual components and classes of equipment. This generalization of electrical components into major systems categories facilitates an analysis that considers system dependencies and redundancies.

However, by generalizing the system into major systems categories, the granular detail of the system and its components (e.g. site specific characteristics, unique or individual pieces of equipment) may not be adequately captured. Therefore, to complete a reasonable study of the entire electrical distribution system, this study has made assumptions, informed by input from Toronto Hydro staff, about the types and classes of equipment and components typically found within each category. While the loss of granular detail may mask localized issues and vulnerabilities, it does allow this project to provide the first climate change based vulnerability assessment of electrical distribution infrastructure. This can help prioritize future investigations, resources and investment on vulnerable systems and their components in order to enhance the resilience of the electrical system.

1.3 Structure of this Report

This report is divided into seven chapters, including the present one. They are:

- Chapter 1: Study Context;
- Chapter 2: Description of the Infrastructure;
- Chapter 3: Assessment of Climate Changes;
- Chapter 4: Vulnerability Assessment Methodology;
- Chapter 5: Assessment Results;
- Chapter 6: Engineering Analysis; and,
- Chapter 7: Conclusions.

Note that Chapter 3, Assessment of Climate Changes and **Appendix B** and **C**, were authored by Risk Sciences International in consultation with AECOM study authors.

[6] This is in contrast to the component level analysis approach which was employed in the pilot case study.

2 Description of the Infrastructure

2.1 Study Area

The Phase 2 study covers Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution infrastructure and supporting civil infrastructure within the boundaries of the City of Toronto. Toronto Hydro distributes electricity across the City of Toronto, Canada's largest city, the provincial capital of Ontario, and home to approximately 2.8 million people (City of Toronto, 2014). The City of Toronto is bordered by the municipalities of Mississauga to the west (in Peel Region), Vaughan and Markham to the north (in York Region), and Pickering to the east (in Durham Region).

The City of Toronto covers approximately 641 km^2 on the northwestern shore of Lake Ontario (City of Toronto, 2014). The city's topography slopes gradually from the lakeshore, approximately 75 m above sea level to 200 m above sea level at its highest point along its northern border (City of Toronto, 2014). Three river systems cross the City of Toronto and flow into Lake Ontario. The Humber River lies on the west side of the City. The Don River essentially crosses the middle of the City of Toronto and flows into Lake Ontario just east of downtown. Finally, the Rouge River crosses the city's eastern edge. These rivers, their tributaries and creeks total about 307 km of water courses and punctuate the City's generally flat landscape with ravines.

The City lies at the eastern edge of the Carolinian Forest zone. The City contains approximately 10 million trees, approximately 4 million of which are publically owned. Of the latter, there are approximately 600,000 trees along streets and public right of ways, and another 3.5 million trees in parks, ravines and other natural areas of the city (City of Toronto, 2014).

2.1.1 Major Systems Categories Under Study

In 2014, Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system served approximately 740,000 customers, of which around 658,000 were residential customers. The components of the Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system are extensive, covering approximately $3 billion dollars in assets, including over 170 transformer stations of different classes, 29,000 km of overhead and underground wires, 20,000+ switches, 60,000+ transformers and 176,000+ poles (Toronto Hydro, 2014b). The present study covers most of Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution infrastructure and civil support structures, with the exclusion of its streetlighting system, and systems serving the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC). The electrical distribution system was divided into six *major systems categories* for the purposes of this study: transmission stations, feeder configurations, system communications, civil structures, mechanical auxiliaries and human resources. Figure 2-1 provides a schematic overview of the systems under study. The *major systems categories* are described hereafter, and hypotheses and generalizations that were made to facilitate the *system level analysis* approach are explained in this chapter. Supporting detail is included in Worksheet 1 of **Appendix H**.

This analysis divides the City of Toronto into two areas: the Former Toronto area and horseshoe area. This distinction is made because most of the legacy equipment is usually found in downtown Toronto and while equipment of newer design can usually be found in the horseshoe area. As such, the *major systems categories* (with the exception of human resources) are also separated between the Former Toronto area (which represents the downtown and inner city) and the horseshoe area (which covers the outlying suburbs). Figure 2-2 shows the division between the Former Toronto area (in green) and the horseshoe area (in blue).

Information about the *major systems categories* was drawn from three principal sources:

- *Overview of the Toronto Hydro Distribution Systems*. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited, 2014, Power point 203 p.
- *Overview of the Toronto Area Transmission Systems and Toronto Hydro Distribution Systems*. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited, 2014, Power point 121 p.

- System Expansion and Studies Section System Reliability Planning Department. *Toronto Hydro Distribution System Planning Guidelines.* Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited, 2007, 22 p.

Figure 2-1 Major System Categories Under Study



Figure 2-2 City of Toronto Study Area



2.2 General System Overview

The electric power system of the province of Ontario is a large interconnected electrical system of generating, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. Generating stations in Ontario are either privately or publicly owned. From the generation stations, the electricity is transmitted throughout the province over high voltage transmission lines, the majority of which is owned by Hydro One Networks Inc. (HONI). The electricity is then distributed to customers by local distribution companies like Toronto Hydro (Figure 2-3).

In the case of the City of Toronto, 230 kV and 115 kV transmission lines owned and operated by HONI bring power to the city. The 230 kV transmission lines mostly serve the horseshoe area, while the 115 kV lines serve most of the Former Toronto area. The 115 kV transmission lines are supplied from three major sources: Leaside station (230/115 kV step down) from the east, Manby station (230/115 kV step down) from the west, and by one generating station located within city limits, the Portlands Energy Centre (PEC) owned by Ontario Power Generation (OPG). PEC generates electricity through three natural gas turbine generators.

Presently, there are 35 transmission stations that step down high voltage currents (230 kV and 115 kV) to the distribution system voltages used by Toronto Hydro (i.e. 27.6 kV and 13.8 kV) (Figure 2-4). The equipment within these stations is owned by either Hydro One or Toronto Hydro, with the exception of Cavanagh station, where all equipment is owned by Toronto Hydro. The division of equipment ownership varies by station. However, since transmission stations are critical, first points of entry of electricity into the city's distribution network, this study considers all equipment within the transmission station, since equipment failure within the station, irrespective of ownership, may compromise its function.

From transmission stations, Toronto Hydro distributes electricity via a network of underground and overhead feeder systems at voltages of 27.6 kV and 13.8 kV. A third distribution voltage level of 4.16 kV, a legacy from historical distribution practices, also operates in the city. The 4.16 kV network is supplied by transformation of 27.6 kV or 13.8 kV feeds at Toronto Hydro owned municipal transformer stations. These three distribution voltages will remain in service for the duration of the Phase 2 study period, even though many of the 4.16 kV power lines are gradually being converted to 13.8 kV and 27.6 kV lines.

This electrical distribution infrastructure is connected via communications systems which afford control and protection of electrical equipment from damage or faults. This system is critical to the operation of the electrical system and is part of this study. In addition, this study considers all civil structures that support the electrical equipment and all mechanical equipment inside underground vaults (ventilation, sumps and pumps). A last category includes all human resources operating and managing Toronto Hydro distribution system.

Figure 2-3 Typical Electric Power System



Source: (Toronto Hydro, 2014d)

Figure 2-4 Transmission Stations



Figure source: (Toronto Hydro, 2014d)

2.3 Substations

2.3.1 Transmission Stations

At the moment, there are 35 transmission stations located in the City of Toronto. Most transmission stations located in the downtown and inner city have primary voltages at 115 kV and step-down to 13.8 kV. In the horseshoe area, the primary voltage is 230 kV and stepped-down to 27.6 kV (most) or 13.8 kV (some). The table below illustrates the list of stations that are divided into the two main service areas, and six sub-service areas[7] (Table 2-1).

[7] Stations have been grouped into these service areas by Toronto Hydro due to:
- Similarity of historical development and presumed potential for future development;
- Theoretical potential for permanently transferring load between neighbouring stations on an operational basis and/or through capital projects;
- Statistical correlation (coefficient of determination, R2) of the overall area growth rate to actual historical peak loads in the area (relative to potential alternative area groupings).

Table 2-1 Transmission Stations and Service Areas[8]

Service Area *(Voltage step down)*	Number of Stations
Former Toronto	
Downtown core *(115 kV/13.8 kV)*	6
Downtown outer *(115/13.8 kV, 230/115 kV, 115/27.6 kV)*	11
Horseshoe	
North Stations *(230/27.6 kV)*	2
East *(230 kV/27.6 kV, 230/115 kV)*	10
Northwest *(230 kV/27.6 kV)*	4
Southwest *(230/27.6 kV, 230/115 kV)*	2

In the Former Toronto area, there are no station ties between station service areas to allow for the transfer of some feeder loads from one station to another. In the horseshoe area, there are existing station ties available to allow the transfer some feeder loads from one station to another.

In the horseshoe area, the transmission stations are considered “outdoor”, as all equipment’s are exposed to the elements. A control building containing weather sensitive equipment and operators control room is located adjacent to the station. In the Former Toronto area, most stations are configured with equipment located indoors. The entire transmission station is surrounded by fences or walls for public safety.

All stations are essentially based on the Dual Element Spot Network (DESN) design configuration. Typically DESN has two power transformers with 230 kV or 115 kV primary windings, two 27.6 kV or 13.8 kV secondary windings and two buses.

By 2016, the Copeland Station (a gas insulated station) will be brought into service in the Former Toronto area. Gas Insulated Stations occupy less space than air insulated stations of comparable capacity. The gas used for insulation in the Copeland Station is Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6).

Typical equipment – Transmission Stations

While each of the 35 transmission stations have site specific characteristics, representative and typical equipment found in all stations are:

[8] Station names have been excluded from this version of the report.

- Power transformers
- Lightning arresters
- Current and voltage transformers (instrument transformers)
- Disconnect-switches or interrupters (loadbreak switches)
- Circuit Breakers
- Medium voltage switchgears
- Bus bars
- Transmission station configurations: double bus - double breaker configuration, double bus - single breaker, double bus - double breaker or double bus and one and a half breakers.

A picture of a typical transmission station yard is shown in Figure 2-5.

Figure 2-5 The Station Yard at Cavanagh Transmission Station

Picture source: (Toronto Hydro, 2014a)

Note that this station *major systems category* does not include civil structures or protection and control systems. These other critical infrastructure components which form part of the transmission station are described under separate *major systems categories* below.

2.3.2 Municipal stations

The municipal stations are divided into two sub-categories. First, “Toronto Hydro to Toronto Hydro” municipal stations step down from 27.6 kV to 13.8 kV or to 4.16 kV in the Horseshoe Area, and in the Former Toronto area from 13.8 kV to 4.16 kV. There are also smaller transformer stations located on the sites of Toronto Hydro customers with high load demands. These stations are called “Toronto Hydro to Private ownership” stations in this study.

Toronto Hydro is converting its 4.16 kV voltage level over time to 13.8 kV and 27.6 kV because of age, loss minimization, equipment inventory reduction, and required or projected future load growth (Toronto Hydro, 2007). Toronto Hydro estimated that by 2030, 50% of the 4.16 kV equipment will be converted in the Horseshoe Area and all of it will be phased out in the Former Toronto area. By 2050, Toronto Hydro is expected to have replaced 70% of the 4.16 kV overhead power lines in the Horseshoe (Hypotheses issued in Workshop 1, 2014).

Toronto Hydro to Toronto Hydro

There are around 169 municipal stations (27.6 kV/ 13.8kV or 27.6 kV/13.8 kV / 4.16 kV) within the City of Toronto. Approximately 82 municipal stations are located entirely within a building, and these indoor stations are mostly located in the Former Toronto area. The remaining stations have some or all equipment located outdoors. These stations are classified as outdoor stations for the purposes of this study, and most are located in the horseshoe area. Figure 2-6 shows a picture of a typical outdoor station located in a residential area. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that all Former Toronto area municipal stations are indoors, while horseshoe stations are outdoors. For those few outdoor stations in the Former Toronto area, their vulnerability will be identical to the outdoor stations in the horseshoe area.

Figure 2-6 Residential Area MS (front and rear views)

Figure source: (Toronto Hydro, 2014a)

Toronto Hydro to Private Ownership

Toronto Hydro to Private Ownership stations supply large loads at low voltages to private customers. The station is located on private property inside a closed room. Most of these stations are owned by Toronto Hydro, although some are owned by the customer.

Typical equipment – Municipal Stations

Typical equipment within municipal stations is similar to transmission stations, but are generally smaller in size because less capacity is required. In general, municipal stations include:

- Oil power transformers (ONAN/ONAF);
- Instrument transformers;
- Disconnect switches;
- Circuit Breakers;
- Cables;
- Fuses;
- Arresters.

2.4 Feeder Systems

Toronto Hydro employs feeder systems, or systems of power lines, transformers, switches and related equipment, to distribute electricity across the City of Toronto. The feeders are either installed on overhead poles (overhead systems) or travel through underground cables (underground systems). Overhead feeder systems can be located on the front side of a property (front lot) or at the back of the property (rear lot). However, rear lot systems will be phased out by the 2030s and are not considered in the scope of this study. They are progressively being replaced

by front lot overhead or underground infrastructure, which provides Toronto Hydro more convenient access. In total, Toronto Hydro customers are served by over 900 feeders[9] (Navigant Consulting Ltd. 2011).

Approximately 30 % of Toronto Hydro's distribution network is comprised of 27.6 kV feeders from 3 - 4 km (considered ''short'' lines) to 5 - 6 km (considered ''long'' lines) in length. These systems are mostly located in the horseshoe area. 70 % of Toronto Hydro's distribution feeders operate at 13.8kV, and vary in length between 2 – 3 km (short) to 3 - 4 km (long) (Navigant Consulting Ltd., 2011). The 13.8 kV systems serve both the downtown and horseshoe areas. A very small percentage of feeders still operate at 4.16 kV.

2.4.1 Electrical Configurations

The electrical configuration of a feeder determines the way electricity is delivered to customers. It is indicative of the feeder's ability to provide electrical service in the event of equipment damage and electrical faults. There are many different electrical configurations of feeders, and they include radial, dual radial, open loop and closed loop systems. Some of these systems may also be nested within one another (e.g. an open loop system with downstream radial feeders). Toronto Hydro's main underground and overhead feeders are arranged in an open loop type configuration, although there are also dual radial and radial feeder systems, some of which may be nested within the open loop configuration. Only one feeder type, the 13.8 kV network, is arranged in a closed loop type configuration. The various electrical configurations considered in this study are:

- Underground dual radial and underground residential distribution (URD) feeders;
- Underground closed loop network feeders;
- Overhead open loop and radial feeders.

In the open loop system, the feeder line runs out of the station through two separate feeder arms that eventually reconnect outside the station to form a loop. A load interrupting switch (tie switch) is located at the reconnection point and is normally kept open between the two feeder arms. If one feeder arm goes out, the load can be fed by the other feeder arm by closing the tie switch. In open loop systems under single contingency condition[10], the customer typically experiences an interruption when the feeder is switched from one feeder arm to the other.

In radial systems, the customer is supplied by only one feeder. It is the least expensive design but also offers the least flexibility in electrical service restoration in the event of a fault, as there is no other feeder that can supply electricity until the line is repaired. Radial feeder segments may be nested within open loop systems.

Dual radial systems are similar in design to radial feeders except that each customer is connected to two parallel radial feeders. The load is supplied by one of the radial feeders, as the other radial feeder remains on standby. In the case of a fault, the load is transferred from one feeder to the other by manipulating interrupter switches tying the two radial feeders together. Large commercial and industrial customers, as well as Toronto Hydro municipal stations and several older Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) stations are typically served by dual radial systems. A compact loop system is similar in configuration to a dual radial system, but is employed where space is more limited (e.g. in existing vaults).

In closed loop systems, customers are supplied by multiple feeders, and are fed via several redundant transformers and network protectors. If one feeder goes out, the customer can be supplied by another feeder. Closed loop systems are advantageous because under single contingency conditions, customers experience no power interruptions (Toronto Hydro, 2007). Only Toronto Hydro's 13.8 kV network system is a closed loop system.

[9] This total may vary depending on how feeder branches and sub-branches are counted.
[10] Single contingency condition or N-1 represents the condition where all electrical equipment is in service except one element. For example, if a substation has two power transformers, but one of them is out of service, the condition is called "N-1". The condition "N-1" generally occurs after a major disturbance causes equipment to trip and go-offline.

Figure 2-7**Error! Reference source not found.** shows the distribution of feeder types across the city. The 13.8 kV network, represented in dark green, is mostly concentrated in downtown Toronto (downtown core and the Yonge Street and Bloor Street corridors), while the other feeder types can be found across the city.

Figure 2-7 Location of Feeders, by Type



Source: Toronto Hydro

Typical equipment

For all underground feeders

The distribution transformer station of underground feeder systems can be classified according to one of three types:

- Vault type: The vault transformer can be small and located just below ground for single phase clients, or large and deeper underground for clients requiring larger, three-phase power supplies. Some vault type transformers can be located above ground inside a building. The equipment located in vault type enclosures cannot operate if the vault is flooded.
- Submersible type: They are designed similarly to the vault type transformer stations but the equipment is designed to operate when submersed. For example, submersible transformers are capable of continuous unattended operation while completely submerged under a head of 3 m of water over the top of the tank (IEEE Std C57.12.24, 2009, p. 3). They are currently the preferred design due to their submersibility.
- Padmount type: The padmount transformer is located on ground level in a metal-clad enclosure.

Underground feeder equipment typically consists of the following:

- Cables: The cables used in underground systems are generally insulated with cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) or a paper insulated lead cover (PILC). The PILC cables also contain oil
- Pilot wire: For large and sensitive customers

- Fault circuit indicators
- Power transformers modules:
    - Load-break switch modules: Metal enclosed, air insulated, Vacuum or SF6 arc extinction, motorized or manual;
    - Fuse modules: Metal enclosed, air insulated, electronic fuses or SF6 power fuses or current limiting fused;
    - Power transformer : Oil type (most), dry type (in above grade vaults) or some used FR3 fluid (environmental friendly);
    - Elbows: cable connections to power transformers.
- Specifically for the network system, typical equipment consists of the following:Primary feeders;
- Network Units;
    - Primary Switch – Embedded in power transformer;
    - N/W Transformer: dry type;
    - N/W Protector: Breaker, back-up fuse, relays, current transformers, cable limiter.
- LV secondary network grid or spot networks;
- Except for the old network protectors, all network unit equipment are submersible.

For overhead, open loop and radial feeders:

- Poles: See civil categories below;
- Distribution transformers : ONAN (Oil Natural Air Natural) system;
- Gang-operated switches, single-phase switches or SCADA switches;
- Load interrupting switches;
- Fuse disconnecting switches;
- Conductors: “tree proof” protected aluminium (AL) conductors, steel reinforced aluminium conductors (ACSR), aluminium conductors (no tree proof protection), and copper (CU, legacy);
- Voltage Regulators;
- Circuit-breakers with reclosers;
- Capacitors;
- Insulators: made from porcelain (approximately half of all installed insulators) and polymer material (porcelain insulators are being progressively replaced by polymer insulators).

2.5 Communications Systems

The communications systems support the control and protection of electrical equipment. They are divided between protection and control systems, and the SCADA system.

For power lines, the distribution switch automation is generally limited to the 27.6 kV systems (Toronto Hydro, 2007).

Protection and control systems

The protection and control systems are located inside control buildings. Except for batteries, they are located in a temperature controlled room. Batteries at some stations in the Former Toronto area are currently located in the basement of buildings. However, Toronto Hydro expects to relocate these battery assets above grade by the 2030’s in order to help reduce flooding threats.

Typical electrical equipment

- Relays:
- Fuse, Load-break Switch, Circuit Breaker;
- Batteries;
- Auxiliary systems: cranes, fire alarm systems, air compressors, etc.

SCADA system

The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system is an automated system to remotely control equipment and gather operating information about electrical equipment.

Typical electrical equipment

- SCADA Switch;
- Battery;
- The remote terminal unit (RTU);
- Fault Detector;
- Fiber optic conductor;
- Motorized cell interrupter.

2.6 Civil Structures

The civil structures house or provide structural support for all electrical equipment. They are found in transmission and municipal stations, and all underground and overhead feeder systems.

As a general rule of thumb, civil structures are generally older in the Former Toronto than in the horseshoe area. Older structures (before 1970) may be more susceptible to climate impacts due to their degradation (wood rotting, corrosion of steel) and lack of reinforcement in concrete and design loads.

Typical equipment

For transmission and municipal stations:

- Gantry Towers;
- Exit lines;
- Equipment supports;
- Building: for indoor stations.

For underground feeders and transformer stations:

- Reinforced concrete cable chambers;
- Concrete vaults;
- Underground cable ducts.

For overhead feeders:

- In 2014, there were approximately 176,000 poles in Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system. The types of poles by construction material are approximately distributed as follows :
    - Concrete : 36%;
    - Aluminum: 2%;
    - Steel: 4%;
    - Cedar Poles : 58%;
    - Fiber glass: Negligible.
    - Iron: Negligible.
- Conductors and hardware (e.g. supports, bolts, etc.);
- Concrete footings (for steel, aluminium, concrete and some wood poles).

2.7 Auxiliary mechanical

Ventilation

All vaults have passive ventilation i.e. natural ventilation through slot openings in cover grates.

Drainage system

Toronto Hydro drainage systems can generally be divided according to the two types of vaults in which they are found:

- Small, shallow single phase sub vaults: do not contain pumps. These vaults' drains are connected to the city's sewer or storm sewer system and drain naturally. These vaults are also being fitted with automatic Petro plugs which stop drainage when oil is detected in the flow (equipment or other pollutant source) in order to prevent oil leaks into the sewer.
- Big deep vaults for Network, URD feeders: most of these kinds of vaults are equipped with mechanical pumps as they are located at a significant depth below grade and often below city sewers. Drains are installed in the walls of the vault and pumps are used to force water into the city's sewer systems. Approximately 10 % of network, URD vaults have drains without pumps (i.e. gravity driven natural drainage).

Sump pump

In 2014, approximately 1600 vaults out of 14,937 vaults had sump pumps (11%) (Toronto Hydro, 2014e). Toronto Hydro estimates that by the 2030's, these sumps will have oil sensing traps that will close if oil (equipment or other pollutant source) is detected.

2.8 Human Resources

Toronto Hydro has approximately 1,500 employees comprised of certified tradespeople, engineers and management professionals (Toronto Hydro, 2012). Employees who are involved in the operation of the electrical distribution system include supervisors and field crews for overhead, underground and network systems, control room staff, call centre workers and dispatchers. Toronto Hydro staff also includes the management team, engineers, asset management specialists and electrical system designers.

Weather can generally affect human resources in two ways. Adverse weather events can affect travel conditions on the journey to and from work for all employees. Furthermore, adverse weather events can affect the working conditions for field crews and field supervisors who need to access, operate or work on equipment across the city. Toronto Hydro strives to ensure a safe working environment for its employees, and has occupational health and safety policies and procedures in place that conform with the international occupational health and safety management system specification OHSAS 18001. These policies and procedures are complemented by the professional judgement of its workers as to whether conditions are safe enough to access outdoor equipment.

2.9 Time Horizon

The evaluation was carried out for the study period (2015 to 2050), but with specific focus on the possible state of the electrical system at the 2030's and 2050's time horizons. For example, this study considered changes to infrastructure systems based on current practices, trends and policy directions (e.g. transition from rear lot to front lot power lines, the partial phase out of 4.16 kV system, some demand and supply projections[11], replacement of

[11] It should be noted that city-wide land use changes (high rises, condo development and population growth) were not included in the analysis, due to the scope of such an undertaking and the complexity of information required. However, system vulnerability was judged based on climate change stresses, as it was assumed that gradual population growth would be accommodated by corresponding growth of Toronto Hydro systems under business as usual practices without the added stress of climate change.

non-submersible equipment). Toronto Hydro documentation, electrical standards and consultations with Toronto Hydro staff were all used to help identify and describe the potential changes to assets at the 2030's and 2050's time horizon. The probability of a climate parameter occurring during the study period and on an annual basis for the 2030's and 2050's was also determined (see next chapter for further details).

2.10 Other Potential Changes that May Affect Infrastructure

2.10.1 Dependencies on Hydro One Infrastructure

Toronto Hydro is part of an interdependent electrical system that is reliant on infrastructure facilities that generate electricity, transmission systems that transport electricity over long distance, and transformer stations that convert voltages for transport and use. The electrical generation and transmission supply infrastructure on which Toronto Hydro relies upon can also be vulnerable to the impacts of a changing climate, and are owned by other electrical companies and organizations in Ontario. Therefore, it is important to note that the vulnerability of Toronto Hydro is therefore also tied to the vulnerability of these supply side infrastructure.

It should also be noted that in the event of a power outage, certain facilities and dependent infrastructure can be supplied by temporary, backup power generators (such as diesel or natural gas generators). In some cases, homeowners may be equipped with photo-voltaic cells that may be able to provide some power in the event of an outage. However, these forms of dispersed generation are specific to facilities and individuals, and not sufficient to meet the demands of larger portions of the population. Dispersed generation does not currently provide sufficient capacity to alleviate Toronto Hydro of its dependence on the large scale electrical generation and transmission supply infrastructure.

Most of the 230 kV, 115 kV and 27.6 kV station equipment that tie Hydro One transmission infrastructure to Toronto Hydro are owned by Hydro One, except for the 27.6 kV breakers at the transmission stations supplying the former North York area and the Cavanagh transmission station, which is totally owned by Toronto Hydro. In general, Toronto Hydro owns the 13.8 kV switchgear equipment. Toronto Hydro and Hydro One share a common Transmission Connection Agreement (Toronto Hydro, 2007).

2.10.2 Load Projections

Electrical load or demand is a significant factor in the operation of transmission stations. Demand is influenced by a variety of factors, including population size, types of uses (e.g. residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, infrastructure), time of day (e.g. peak, off-peak, night time), as well as daily temperature (e.g. heating, cooling).

For the present study, the projections of electrical load on each of the main transmission stations serving the City of Toronto were completed, and are shown in the next table. The methodology used by Toronto Hydro to calculate the projected load for the 2030's and 2050's is described in **Appendix F**. Major future load demand, added transmission station added capacity (i.e. growth), and proposed load transfers[12] were considered by Toronto Hydro.

[12] Load transfer represents the capability to discharge some load from one station to another transmission station. In case of an outage or a very high demand, the loss of supply, or requirement for additional electricity can be provided by another location. Some transmission stations have higher transfer capabilities than others due to higher installed capacity and/or lower demand. However, this capability changes with time: the increasing demand can lessen this flexibility, while investments in new additional capacity can increase the station capability.

Table 2-2 Load Projections by Transmission Station

Service Area *(Voltage step down)*	Number of Stations	Projected load (2030's)[13]	Projected load (2050's)
Former Toronto			
Downtown core *(115 kV/13.8 kV)*	6	86-95%	>95%
Downtown outer *(115/13.8 kV, 230/115 kV,115/27.6 kV)*	2	70-85%	>95%
	6	86-95%	
	3	>95%	
Horseshoe			
North Stations *(230/27.6 kV)*	1	86-95%	>100%
	1		86-95%
East *(230 kV/27.6 kV, 230/115 kV)*	1	<70%	70-85%
	2	<70%	86-95%
	3	70-85%	86-95%
	2	86-95%	86-95%
	1	86-95%	>100%
	1	>100%	>100%
Northwest *(230 kV/27.6 kV)*	2	70-85%	>100%
	1	86-95%	86-95%
	1	<70%	86-95%
Southwest *(230/27.6 kV,230/115 kV)*	2	86-95%	>100%

2.11 Data Sufficiency

The general characteristics of the systems under review were adequate for the purpose of this exercise, although it should be noted that no site visit was conducted in the project. Chapter 7 contains recommendations about further work that can be used to enhance the analysis of electrical system performance and sensitivities to climate related stresses.

[13] Note that Toronto Hydro considers 95 % as the max station load capacity in former Toronto area. This is because there are no station ties between station service areas to allow for the transfer of some feeder loads from one station to another. When a former Toronto area station achieves 95% of its capacity, it signals to Toronto Hydro that a station load relief project is required. In the horseshoe area, station max capacity is considered to be 100% max load capacity, as there are existing station ties available to allow the transfer of feeder loads from one station to another.

3 Assessment of Climate Changes

This chapter describes how the climate data used in this study was developed. This work involved three activities, the identification of climate parameters, the estimation of the historical and future probability of occurrence of climate parameters, and the conversion of probabilities into PIEVC scoring to support the risk assessment. The results of this work are summarized in a table at the end of this chapter (Table 3-2). **Appendix B** and **C** support this chapter, providing additional background information on the methods, information sources and assumptions. The climate work was principally conducted by Risk Sciences International in collaboration with AECOM.

3.1 Climate Data Development Methodology

The development of climate data to support this study involved three main activities.

- First, climate parameters (e.g. temperature, precipitation, wind) and threshold values at which infrastructure performance would be affected were identified (i.e. climate parameters);
- Next, the probability of occurrence of each climate parameter was estimated for future climates; and,
- Finally, the probability information of climate parameters was converted into the PIEVC seven point scoring scale to support the risk assessment.

3.1.1 Identification of Climate Parameters

The identification of relevant climate parameters and infrastructure impact thresholds was an iterative process involving a combination of three methods:

- Literature review of design loads in codes, standards and published literature;
- Practitioner consultation, including targeted interviews, email communications, and workshops; and,
- Forensic analyses of either system specific case studies or relevant cases in the published and grey literature.

While these methods were employed during Phase I, they were expanded significantly and updated for Phase 2. The list of climate parameters from Phase 1 of this study was revisited through practitioner consultations (i.e. workshops), and a more thorough forensic analysis process was conducted using newly available impacts data provided by Toronto Hydro. Literature, including the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and CSA standards, was reviewed by both RSI and AECOM research team members, yielding more specific design thresholds and criteria. Further information about these techniques can be found in **Appendix B.**

3.1.2 Estimating the Probability of Occurrence of Climate Parameters

To estimate the probability of occurrence of climate parameters over the study period, their probability of occurrence was first established for historical climates. Future conditions cannot be well understood until current and historical climate conditions are quantified, particularly with regards to already existing vulnerabilities and thresholds present within the distribution system. This historical information was combined with climate projections from an ensemble of global climate models through the application of the “Delta-method” (see description on next page) to obtain estimates of the probability of occurrence for climate parameters. Additional complementary estimation techniques (i.e. regional climate models, statistical downscaling, climate analogues) were also employed to evaluate several complex climate events (e.g. freezing rain, ice storms, high intensity rainfall, lightning, tornadoes), as well as to validate or refine the results obtained from the “Delta-method” approach. These tasks are summarized in the following section while more details can be found in **Appendix B**.

Establishing Historical Climate Baseline

The probability of occurrence of climate parameters under historical climate conditions was established in Phase I of this study. Phase 2 reviewed and further refined them in order to serve as a baseline for climate change projections.

Historical climate conditions were established based on Environment Canada's climate station network, the most reliable and highest quality long-term climate record in Canada. While there are numerous climate stations in and around the City of Toronto, detailed hourly weather data are usually only available from airport locations. Thus, the majority of historical climate information used in this analysis is based on records from Pearson International Airport, with further contributions from Buttonville and Toronto Island Airports. Toronto is also the location of the climate station with the longest period of record in Canada, located at its City Centre location, a separate site which provided further perspective on longer term historical climate.

In the case of extreme, very localized, or complex climate events (e.g. tornadoes, freezing rain, ice storms, lightning storms), authors employed alternative methods (e.g. using averaging periods greater than 30 years) or consulted alternative data sets (e.g. the historical tornado database) to establish a historical baseline because this information was not directly available from weather station data.

Future Projections

The climate projection data which serves as a basis for this study was sourced principally from global climate models (GCMs). The latest International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 5th Assessment Report (AR5) provided results from 40 GCMs, produced and operated by modeling centres from around the globe. These models provide many of the basic parameters used in developing projections, as well as providing the "boundary conditions" for more detailed assessments, such as downscaling studies. The availability of multiple models also allows for the use of climate model "ensembles," which use multiple models for the development of projections, rather than employing the results of a single model which may contain biases affecting the accuracy of results. The use of ensembles is considered by the IPCC as a best practice for climate analyses, and therefore has been the dominant method used for climate projections in Phase 2.

GCMs require "emissions scenarios" as inputs for the calculation of climate projections. The latest IPCC AR5 has introduced a new method of describing future changes in emissions. Representative Concentration Pathways, or RCPs, describe explicitly the expected increase in energy generated by increases in greenhouse gases. The most pessimistic emissions scenario, RCP 8.5, indicates an increase of 8.5 watts per square meter of additional energy under future climate conditions. It is referred to as the "business as usual" emissions scenario, provides the best fit based on historical trends in global emissions, and was the scenario used for Phase 2. Further details on IPCC findings, GCMs, RCPs, and other aspects of climate change projections, can be found in **Appendix B.**

Applying the "Delta-Method"

Individual GCMs contain inherent biases when attempting to recreate historical climate, for example being either too cool or warm compared to historical averages. To compensate for this effect, the "Delta-method" was employed. First, GCMs were evaluated to determine changes from their own respective baselines. This difference between model baseline and projected conditions is then applied to the observed historical climate baseline. For example, if the GCM ensemble indicated an average increase of 2 degrees between the baseline period and the 2050's, and a given station shows an average annual temperature of 3°C, then the projected annual average temperature for that location for the 2050's becomes 5°C. This represents the "delta", or the change in climate parameter based on the difference projected by the GCM ensemble applied to historical baseline data.

Treatment of Complex Climate Events

To validate the results obtained from the GCM – "Delta-Method" for some of the climate parameters, three other complementary estimation techniques were also used, regional climate modeling, statistical downscaling

techniques and climate analogues. Furthermore, some complex climate events tend to occur on much smaller spatial and temporal scales than are covered by GCMs (e.g. tornadoes, freezing rain, ice storms, lightning). Use of these three complementary estimation techniques was necessary to develop projections for these kinds of climate parameters.

It should be noted, however, that even with the availability of specialized methods, there remain highly localized atmospheric events which cannot be projected with confidence, and the effects of climate change on these types of events are still being researched by the climate research community. See **Appendix B** for further discussion of developing projections for complex climate events.

Estimating the Probability of Occurrence of Climate parameters

The methodology used for determining climate parameter probabilities for Phase 2 was somewhat modified from standard PIEVC Protocol based studies. The Protocol (Engineers Canada, 2012) indicates that the probability of a climate parameter occurring should be based on the probability of occurrence during the *full* time period of the study, which is typically the life cycle and long-term planning considerations of the infrastructure under study. For Phase 2, a period of 35 years between 2015 and 2050 was chosen. However, in recognition that response to these hazards can include both asset hardening/replacement cycles (long-term measures) as well as maintenance and management considerations (short term measures), a second set of probabilities based on annual occurrence was also determined. Examining both annual and study period probabilities was useful for understanding vulnerabilities based on climate parameters that would occur on an annual basis (e.g. high temperature) against those which would occur less than annually, but with the potential to cause significant impacts sometime during the 35 year study period (e.g. ice storms, high winds, tornadoes).

Annual probabilities are expressed as the number of occurrences per year for historical and (where available) projected estimates for the 2030's and 2050's, or more specifically for 30 year periods centred on those future decades. The so-called "study period" or "lifecycle" probability of occurrence is then expressed as a percentage (i.e. given those annual frequencies, what is the overall probability that an event will occur during the *entire 35 year time horizon*?).

The probability of occurrence of a climate parameter considered in this project is, in most cases, representative of a "point" probability (i.e. historical probability values based on measurements at a single location). However, the lightning and tornado climate parameters were also evaluated using different "target" sizes to illustrate the effects of changing this perspective, as well as to better correspond with field conditions and associated response. More detailed information about how the probabilities of individual climate parameters were determined can be found in **Appendix B**. The results of this work are listed in Table 3-2 at the end of this chapter.

3.1.3 Assigning a PIEVC Score to Climate parameter Probabilities

The probability of occurrence for climate parameters both annual and during the study period were converted into PIEVC probability scores (i.e. 0-7) for the risk assessment, following the quantitative "Method B" approach indicated in the Protocol (Engineers Canada, 2012) (see Table 3-1). For example, the annual probability of occurrence of high temperatures above 40°C was estimated to occur approximately 0.01 times per year in the historical period (last 100 years), or 1 % probability of occurring each year (PIEVC score 1). Similarly the annual probability for this parameter was 0.3 to 2 times per year for the 2030s, which signifies a 30 % to >100 % probability of occurring each year (PIEVC scores 4 to 7 respectively). This climate parameter is estimated to occur between 1 to 7 days per year by the 2050s, such the annual probability of occurrence is >100% (PIEVC score 7).

Table 3-1 PIEVC Version 10 Probability Scores based on Method B

Score	Probability	
0	< 0.1 %	< 1 in 1,000
1	1 %	1 in 100
2	5 %	1 in 20
3	10 %	1 in 10
4	20 %	1 in 5
5	40 %	1 in 2.5
6	70 %	1 in 1.4
7	> 99 %	> 1 in 1.01

3.2 Summary of Results

24 climate parameters covering temperature, precipitation, wind and lightning hazards were considered within the climate analysis. However, four of them were not carried forward in the vulnerability assessment due to data availability issues or relevance[14]. Table 3-2 provides a summary of the climate data results. Relevant climate parameters and infrastructure thresholds (climate parameters) to be used in this study are listed. For these climate parameters, historical and future probabilities of occurrence, as well as PIEVC probability scores for annual and study period probabilities are presented.

Table 3-2 Climate Parameters and Thresholds, Occurrence Probabilities and PIEVC Scoring

Climate Parameter	Threshold	Annual Probability (Historical; **Projected 2030 and *2050***)	Probability of Occurrence Study Period (2015-2050)	PIEVC Scoring		
				Historical	2030's & 2050's	Study Period
Daily Maximum Temperatures	25°C	66 per year; **84 per year**, ***106 per year***	100%	7	7	7
	30°C	16 per year; **26 per year**, ***47 per year***	100%	7	7	7
	35°C	0.75 per year; **3 per year**, ***8 per year***	100%	6	7	7
	40°C	~0.01 per year[15]; **0.3 to 2 days per year, *1-7 days per year***	~100%	1	4 - 7	7
High Daily Avg Temperature	30°C	0.07 per year[16]; **N/A, *1.2 days per year***	~100%	3	7	7
	35°C	*Zero* occurrences historically; ***zero occurrences projected***	0%	0	0	0
Heat Wave	3 days max temp over 30°C	0.88 per year; **>1 for both**	100%	6	7	7
High Night time Temperatures	Nighttime low ≥23°C	0.70 per year; **7 per year, *16 per year***	~100%	6	7	7
Extreme Rainfall	100 mm in <1 day + antecedent	0.04 per year; ***extreme precipitation expected ↑, percentage unknown***	~75%-85%	2	3	6

[14] The climate parameters not evaluated in the vulnerability assessment were high daily average temperature above 35°C (relevance), 6 hr+ freezing rain (relevance, as no ice accretion threshold was known), Minor ice accretion and deicing agents (complex interaction, no projection data available) and tree growth, pest and disease (complex interaction, no data available).
[15] Based on data from Toronto City Center station rather than Pearson Airport.
[16] Based on 4 occurrences since 1961 at Pearson Airport; see discussion in text for further details.

Climate Parameter	Threshold	Annual Probability (Historical; **Projected 2030 and *2050***)	Probability of Occurrence Study Period (2015-2050)	PIEVC Scoring		
				Historical	2030's & 2050's	Study Period
Ice Storm/Freezing Rain	15 mm (tree branches)	0.11 per year; **>0.13 per year, *>0.16 per year***	>99%	3	3	7
	25 mm ≈ 12.5 mm radial	0.06 days per year; **>0.07 per year, *>0.09 per year***	>95%	2	3	7
	60 mm ≈ 30 mm radial	High Risk: 0.007 events per year; **>0.008 per year; *>0.01 per year*** Low Risk: 0.002 events per year; **> 0.0023 per year; *0.003 per year***	High: ~25% Low: ~8%	0-1	0-1	2-4
	6 hours + freezing rain	0.65 days per year; **~0.75 per year, ~0.9*4 per year***	100%	5	6	7
High Winds	70 km/h+ (tree branches)	21 days per year***; N/A, 24 to 26 per year***	100%	7	7	7
	90 km/h	2 days per year; **N/A, *>2.5 per year***	100%	7	7	7
	120 km/h	~0.05 days per year; ***likely ↑, but % unknown***	~85% or higher	2	2	7
Tornado	EF1+	1-in-6,000; ***Unknown, no consensus***	~0.6%	0	0	1
	EF2+	1-in-12,000; ***Unknown, no consensus***	~0.3%	0	0	0
Lightning[17]	Flash density per km km^2	1.12 to 2.24 per year per km^2; ***Expected increase, % change unknown***	~50-70%(Lg); ~10-20% (Sm)	Lg - 2 Sm - 0	n/a	Lg – 6 Sm - 3
Snowfall	Days w/ >10 cm	1.5 days per year; ***Trend decreasing but highly variable***	100%	7	7	7
	Days w/ > 5cm	5 days per year; ***Trend decreasing but highly variable***	100%	7	7	7
Frost		229 frost free days; **249 frost free days, *273 frost free days***	100%	7	7	7
Complex Interactions	Minor ice accretion + deicing agents	***Projections unavailable***	N/A		N/A	
Complex Interactions	Changes in tree growth, disease conditions	***Projections unavailable***	N/A		N/A	

3.3 Data Sufficiency and Recommendations

The primary sources of information used in this climate data work were:

- Environment Canada Weather Station Data;
- IPCC AR5 quality controlled GCM output;
- TRCA environmental data and observations (TRCA 2014).

The climate data available for this study was judged to be sufficient to cover the majority of climate related stresses to electrical distribution systems (stemming from temperature, precipitation and wind). The study area of the City of Toronto also benefited from having good quality, long-term climate data that covered most areas of the city for these types of climate parameters. While further studies, in-depth analyses, and data quality improvements can be made (see Chapter 7), the climate data that was available was sufficient to support the risk assessment.

[17] Note that "Lg" and "Sm" refer to large and small transformer stations, see Appendix B for more details.

4 Vulnerability Assessment Methodology

The vulnerability of the electrical system to climate parameters was initially completed by employing a screening level risk based methodology (risk assessment) to identify low, medium and high risk interactions. The level of risk was evaluated based on the probability of occurrence of a climate parameter coupled with the severity (consequence) of the impact on the system and on electrical service provision. Low risk level interactions were generally judged as not being a significant issue for Toronto Hydro. Medium level risks were evaluated through a further engineering analysis to determine whether the interaction resulted in vulnerabilities (or part of a general pattern of vulnerability). Finally high risk level interactions were deemed as vulnerabilities for Toronto Hydro.

The general procedure for the risk assessment is described in Step 3 of the Protocol. However, study specific considerations (e.g. the *systems level approach*), adaptations and guidance for completing the risk assessment are described in the following chapter. Completion of the risk assessment follows the "Consultant Option" of the Protocol[18]. Notably in this option, AECOM completed the risk matrix through internal meetings with its own electrical engineers. This information was then validated with Toronto Hydro staff in a workshop held on October 10, 2014, at Toronto Hydro's offices.

4.1 Risk Tolerance Thresholds

The risk tolerance thresholds employed within this analysis conform with the proposed thresholds of the Protocol as given in the table below. These thresholds were validated with Toronto Hydro at the workshop.

Table 4-1 Risk Tolerance Thresholds

Risk Range	Threshold	Response
< 12	Low Risk	Monitoring or no further action necessary
12 – 36	Medium Risk	Vulnerability may be present. Action may be required, TBD through engineering analysis
> 36	High Risk	Vulnerability present, action required

4.2 Yes/No Analysis

The first consideration of the risk assessment is to identify whether a climate parameter will interact with the infrastructure system under consideration. A Yes/No analysis column for each of the 20 climate parameters is included in the risk assessment matrix presented in **Appendix D**. A "No (N)" result means that there is no interaction between the climate parameter and infrastructure system, while a "Yes (Y)" result means that there may be an interaction. The severity assessment is conducted only for "Yes" interactions.

4.3 Infrastructure Performance Responses - Systems Level Approach

As mentioned in the introduction, this study adopts a *systems level approach* to the analysis of climate change impacts on Toronto Hydro electrical distribution infrastructure due to the extensive, complex and interdependent nature of the electrical system. The severity of impact is evaluated based on the consequences of the interaction of different weather events with the systems and subsystems under study.

The relevant infrastructure performance responses remain the same as presented in the pilot case study. Notably, they are:

- Structural design - *Structural integrity, cracking, deformation, foundation anchoring, etc.*

[18] This approach, rather than the facilitated option, was adopted in this study because it was more efficient; the learnings gained from the pilot case study provided AECOM with the necessary insight to complete the risk assessment on its own prior to validation with Toronto Hydro.

- Functionality - *Effective load capacity, efficiency, etc.*
- Serviceability - *Ability to conduct maintenance or refurbishment, etc.*
- Operations, maintenance and materials performance - *Occupational safety, worksite access, operations and maintenance practices (frequency and type), etc.*
- Emergency Response - *Planning, access, response time*
- Insurance Considerations (Toronto Hydro perspective) - *claimable for repair, cause 3rd party payment, affect insurance rates*
- Policy and Procedure Considerations - *Planning, public sector, operations, maintenance policies and procedures, etc.*
- Health and Safety - *Injury, death, health and safety of Toronto Hydro employees, the public, etc.*
- Social Effects - *Use and enjoyment, access, commerce, damage to community assets (buildings), public perception, etc.*
- Environmental Effects - *Release or harm to natural systems (air, water, ground, flora, fauna)*

It is clear that within a *systems level approach*, weather interactions with infrastructure systems can solicit a range of different performance responses, as well as responses of differing degrees (i.e. intensity) from different components. In other words, some components within a system are more sensitive to certain types of weather events than others (e.g. heat affects the operation of transformers more than it affects the wooden pole on which the transformer is attached).

In order to conduct a logical, structured analysis, the proposed *systems level approach* identifies the infrastructure performance response stemming from the component (e.g. pole, transformer, power line, switch, etc.) which constitutes the weakest link in the system category for a given weather parameter. The component whose functionality, capacity, structural integrity or operation is affected or compromised the most, which in turn may cause other interdependent components or the entire system to cease to operate, fail, or lose capacity, constitutes the weakest link in the system. For example, the failure of a station power transformer due to high temperature and load may cut off electricity service, irrespective of what the heat may do to other equipment and structures. The station power transformer is thus considered to be the most sensitive and weakest link under high heat conditions.

As the primary role of Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution infrastructure is to provide electricity, one primary guiding criteria was used to determine which component(s) within the major systems categories constituted its weakest link: the component which, due to an interaction with a weather event, resulted in damage/failure of that component, which in turn compromised the ability of the system to deliver electricity to customers safely and securely. The risk assessment matrix presented in **Appendix D** contains a column named "consequence" which identifies the weakest link component and the anticipated infrastructure performance response.

4.3.1 Consideration of Redundancy and Station Capacity

While a component malfunction or failure may compromise the system's ability to provide electricity safely and securely, a *systems level approach* allows system design characteristics to mitigate this impact. Two notable characteristics of electrical systems are considered by this study: redundancy and station capacity.

Redundancy is the duplication of equipment and systems that afford an alternative way to deliver electrical services in the event of equipment damage or failure. In electrical systems, redundancy is provided through the presence of similar or identical equipment operating in parallel or kept on standby, and is a key component of essential infrastructure services such as electricity provision. Station capacity indicates that a station possesses capacity in excess of normal demand (i.e. under normal circumstances).

Redundancy and station capacity are characteristic of the different types of electrical systems under study. As redundancy and station capacity can mitigate component failures (i.e. allow systems to continue to provide electricity despite equipment failure in one area), they are used as mitigating factors which can attenuate severity

scores. The explanation of how redundancy and station capacity are evaluated for each of the major systems categories is in presented in the sections below.

Transmission Stations

A station's ability to mitigate the system's vulnerability to climate is most usefully considered with respect to high temperatures. During high temperatures, stations with greater excess capacity will be able to continue to supply electricity despite increased demand, while stations with less excess capacity may have to reduce demand (e.g. shed load through temporary forced outages) in order to operate station equipment acceptably (e.g. to avoid overheat and burnout).

Transmission station capacity is based on the load projection exercise completed by Toronto Hydro for this project. This study is briefly described in **Appendix F (**Also see Chapter 2, *Load projections*, for more information). Station capacity is rated as low or good based on the load cut-offs shown in the table below. If the station capacity is rated as low by the end of the study period (2050's), its severity evaluation for high temperature parameters is increased by ''+1''.

It is possible that excess station capacity can also be considered as a mitigating factor in the event of freezing rain, flooding, high winds, etc. For example, if a high wind event causes flying debris to damage an outdoor station, an adjacent station can help by picking up some of the load. In this case, it is the capacity of adjacent stations which helps determine the vulnerability of a service area. In the horseshoe area, station and feeder ties between service areas allow some of the load to be transferred[19]. However, this factor is not considered in the present study because adjacent stations can only take on a small portion of a faulted station's load (i.e. no station is designed to take the full load of an adjacent station, otherwise it would be overdesigned), nor are there sufficient feeder or station ties to allow the complete transfer of the load. Thus, large portions of a service area may still be susceptible to an outage at its transmission station in spite of the fact that an adjacent station has excess capacity.

Table 4-2 Severity Rating Based on Station Capacity by the 2050's

Severity Rating	Station Projected Load by the 2050's
Low (+1)	≥ 95 % (Toronto) and ≥100% Horseshoe Area
Good (no change)	< 95 %

Municipal Stations

The redundancy of the municipal stations is based on geography, and only considered for high temperature parameters for the same reasons as listed above under transmission stations. According to Toronto Hydro, if a municipal station is located in the Former Toronto area, it is generally considered that the station has less transfer capability than a station located in the horseshoe area. Severity ratings for all municipal stations in the Former Toronto area are increased by ''+1'' to reflect the low station transfer capacity in the event of a problem. This severity increase for former Toronto area municipal stations does not apply to other climate events such as freezing rain or wind because these stations are generally located indoors in the Former Toronto area.

The Toronto Hydro to Private ownership stations are dedicated to the owner. There are no transfer capacities to another station. A ''+1'' is added to the severity rating for high temperature parameters.

[19] Recall that at present, there are no station ties between station service areas in the Former Toronto area. The addition of station ties in this area is constrained by the fact that infrastructure is older, located in a dense built urban environment, and generally underground. At present, Toronto Hydro is considering the addition of station ties in the Former Toronto area, but this is not considered in this risk assessment due to its preliminary nature of this idea. In the horseshoe area, station ties allow stations to provide some load relief to adjacent service areas when required.

Underground Feeders

The redundancy of the underground feeders is based on the configuration of the feeder and its location in the city. Dual radial and residential feeders in the Former Toronto area are considered to have the lowest redundancy and capacity because structures are older, more stressed by higher loads, and are installed with less space between the conductors. The arrangement of the conductors is important because the ampacity of conductors are sensitive to the heat generated by nearby conductors. Severity ratings for these feeders are increased by ‘’+1’’ as a result (Table 4-3).

Table 4-3 Severity Rating Based on Feeder Configuration

Severity Rating	Increasing Levels of Feeder Redundancy
Low (+1)	Dual Radial & URD : Former Toronto
Moderate (no change)	Dual Radial & URD : Horseshoe
Good (no change)	Compact Loop Design
Best (no change)	Network

Overhead Feeders

The redundancy of the overhead feeders is considered between two configurations: radial or loop. Radial lines cannot be backed-up in the event of a fault, while loop configurations could allow electricity to be brought in through the “other side” of the loop. For this purpose, the severity ratings for radial feeder configurations are increased by ‘’+1’’.

Communications Systems

The redundancy evaluation is not considered for the communications systems, as they do not mitigate circumstances of loss of electrical service provision.

Civil Structures

Historically, infrastructure built for the distribution of electricity in the City of Toronto were concentrated in the downtown core and inner city and later extended to the horseshoe area. Part of the electrical equipment was replaced over time but much of the civil structures (e.g. underground vaults) remain in place due to their expected lifespan (35 - 60 years). It is thus assumed that the civil structures in the Former Toronto area are older and more degraded than the structures in the Horseshoe Area. A ‘’+1’’ severity scoring is added to the Former Toronto civil structures.

4.4 Scoring Severity

The severity scoring exercise is conducted using the scoring scale defined by the Protocol, method D. Examples of impacts on different equipment were developed in the course of this analysis. In addition to the guidance provided by the Protocol on severity scoring, this study provides a further, electrical system specific consideration in severity scoring. Two complementary, severity scoring scales were developed for this study to reflect the severity scoring differences between stations and feeder systems. As stations represent major nodes in the distribution of electricity, an affected or disabled station could result in a loss of service on all downstream feeder systems and customers. However, if a feeder branch or sub-branch is affected, only the customers on the branch or sub-branch may be affected. Thus, the impacts on station equipment are judged to be more severe than impacts on feeder systems. The severity scoring scale employed in this study, as presented below, reflects this general consideration.

Table 4-4 Severity Scoring Scale for Electrical Distribution Systems

Score	Stations			Feeders	
	Method D	**Descriptive**	**Examples**	**Descriptive**	**Example**
0	No Effect	Negligible or N/A		Negligible or N/A	
1	Measurable	Very Low - Some measurable change		Some loss of serviceability & capacity, no loss of function	*Arrestor failure, overheating cables, salt deterioration of civil/electrical equipment*
2	Minor	Low - Slight loss of serviceability	*Station battery – lifespan shortened*	Some loss of capacity & function	*Overheating transformer from high load*
3	Moderate	Moderate loss of serviceability, some loss of capacity, but no loss of function	*Station transformer heating up, but possibility of meeting demand from another station*	Moderate loss of function	*Broken spring in underground switchgear, distribution transformer out (must replace), cable*
4	Major	Major loss of serviceability, some loss of capacity & function	*Station transformer heating up, need to do load shedding*	Major loss of function of multiple equipment – localized	*Transformer and switchgear out (replace multiple equipment)*
5	Serious	More loss of capacity & function	*Station transformer heating up, need to do load shedding for longer duration*	Major loss of function of multiple equipment – wide area	*Transformer and Switchgear out Flooded vault that cannot be pumped*
6	Hazardous	Major - Loss of Function	*Loss of CT/VT transformer, battery assets*	Major loss of function of multiple equipment – wide area	*Leaning pole/downed line*
7	Catastrophic	Extreme – Loss of Asset	*Station trans. failure*	Major loss of function of multiple equipment – wide area	*Downed pole, line and transformer*

4.5 Mapping Risks

Due to the sheer number of similar assets and their distribution across the city, study authors and Toronto Hydro have elected to map climate change risks to the electrical distribution system in the City of Toronto. It was decided that two main asset classes would be included in the risk map: stations and feeders. The risks to supporting infrastructure, such as communication systems and civil structures, were difficult to represent on such a large scale. Furthermore, the risks to these systems are generally associated with, and can be adequately illustrated by, the risks to the stations and feeder systems.

The risk mapping exercise was completed using the geographic information systems (GIS) resources provided by Toronto Hydro. AECOM provided the final risk assessment matrix results to Toronto Hydro's GIS team. Each of the station and feeder assets in the risk assessment matrix were identified on GIS maps. Stations were illustrated as polygons representing the stations' service areas rather than as points where stations are located. This was done in order to illustrate the fact that faults at a station can affect an entire service area. Feeder systems were illustrated as line vectors on the map. Next, the low, medium or high classification of station or feeder risks were represented by colouring the assets class representations (polygons or lines) in yellow, orange or red to denote low, medium and high risks respectively. Where there were no interactions between climate and infrastructure, asset representations were coloured in grey. Finally, white spaces within the City of Toronto generally indicate where no electrical service is provided. Results of the risk mapping exercise are presented in Chapter 5 and in **Appendix E**.

5 Assessment Results

This chapter presents a summary of anticipated impacts from the interaction of climate events with electrical distribution system infrastructure resulting in low, medium and high risk interactions. In addition, special case risks are also presented.

5.1 Low Risk Interactions

High Temperature

SCADA systems may be affected by ambient air temperatures above 40°C. According to equipment design specifications (S&C manufacturer, 2011), such temperatures constitute unusual conditions for the interrupters within the SCADA system. At high temperatures over 40°C, the accuracy of power line current and voltage sensors, as well as the ability to provide DC voltages for the control of the switch, are not assured. SCADA system equipment are tested to operate between -40°C to +40°C. However, other components of the SCADA system like the communication and control unit can operate at temperatures up to +70°C. A low risk score was given considering that the SCADA switch is able to operate in temperatures above 40°C, but its performance (accuracy of sensors) may decrease.

Extreme Rainfall

Extreme rainfall poses a low risk to certain underground feeder systems in the horseshoe area. Underground feeder systems with some equipment located in above ground vaults or on padmounts may be affected by localized flooding due to extremely rainfall. This creates an issue in terms of accessing equipment.

Some transmission stations in the Former Toronto area currently have batteries and switchgear located below grade. This equipment could be damaged if flooding occurred. Toronto Hydro is currently moving its battery assets above grade when they reach the end of their lifecycle (typically 10 – 12 years). By the 2030's, it is expected that all station batteries will be moved above grade. Some of the switchgear equipment will also be moved above grade, although stations in the Former Toronto area may face space constraints to moving all equipment above grade. As such, it is likely that some switchgear will still be located below grade by the 2030s. However, stations are equipped with multiple sump pumps which can evacuate water that flows into the basements. According to a Toronto Hydro representative, there have been no flooding incidents to Toronto Hydro stations owing to heavy precipitation over the last several decades due to the pump and drainage systems found in stations. Based on expected work to relocate batteries and certain switchgear, and continued adequacy of sump pumps, the risk of flooding from extreme rainfall for transmission stations in the Former Toronto area was rated as a low risk.

Freezing Rain

For stations, 15 mm or less of freezing rain are not expected to create sufficient ice loads to cause structural problems. Freezing rain could cause some delays in accessing equipment (e.g. ground or equipment encrusted with a layer of ice), although this was judged to be of low risk by workshop participants

Snow

Snow accumulation and snow fall, especially for days with >10 cm of snow, can also cause visibility and access issues. Access to padmounted transformers and switches, as well as underground vaults may be hampered by snow pushed aside from road and sidewalk snow clearing equipment, thereby lengthening the time needed to access equipment. However, access issues from snow were judged to be of low risk by workshop participants.

Frost

Frost may cause the displacement of the ground (frost heave) and compromise the stability of the foundations of poles, vaults and cable chambers. Frost heave events are generally localized, and do not tend to disrupt electrical service. Furthermore, the number of frost free days are expected to increase by 2050 due to increases in annual temperatures. For these reasons, frost was judged to be of low risk. Civil structures located in the former Toronto area were given a slightly higher (+1) severity rating (and therefore risk rating) because the infrastructure is generally older than those found in the horseshoe area.

5.2 Medium Risk Interactions

High Temperature

High ambient air temperatures starting at 25°C and above are responsible for the majority of medium risks evaluated within this study. Unless stated, the temperatures presented below exclude consideration of humidity on felt temperature (i.e. humidex). From an electrical equipment point of view, it is the ambient air temperature, not humidity, which impacts the structural integrity or lifespan of equipment. Humidity, coupled with high ambient air temperatures may result in higher felt temperatures by people, which in turn can increase the demand for air-conditioning. However, risks posed by high temperatures to infrastructure are evaluated in terms of their design and performance characteristics (ability to shed heat or cool down), which are not affected by humidity levels. High humidity was considered when evaluating the risks to Toronto Hydro personnel.

High temperatures affect the lifespan of station batteries. Where the air temperature of rooms that house station batteries exceeds 25°C, the lifespan of the batteries will begin to degrade. This will result in the long-term in the replacement of batteries sooner than expected. The buildings containing the rooms where batteries are stored afford some protection from changes to external air temperatures. This means that an external air temperature of 25°C may not immediately trigger the premature degradation of batteries. However, rooms where batteries are stored are not temperature regulated, and the impacts to battery lifespan will increase as external air temperatures increase above 25°C. Heat impacts on station battery lifespan were judged to be of medium risk.

As maximum daily air temperatures exceed 35°C, station power transformers will be the most critical pieces of equipment to be affected. First, the use of air-conditioning will increase, thereby increasing the electrical load on transformers. Transformers will heat up, but warm ambient air temperatures also reduce the effectiveness of natural or mechanical cooling. Stations with low projected excess capacities by the 2030's and 2050's will be less able to meet additional demand during periods of high temperature because of higher existing base load. These include transmission stations located in downtown areas, as well as Bathurst station, Sheppard, Leaside, Rexdale, Woodbridge, Manby and Horner. These were judged to be slightly more at risk (+1 severity) as compared to other stations in the East and Northwest sub-service areas.

Heat waves, when the daily maximum temperature during three consecutive days exceeds 30°C, as well as warm nights (minimum temperatures ≥ 23°C) both constitute medium risks for station power transformers. High night time temperatures will result in continued electrical use for air-conditioning, and also decrease the potential for transformers to cool down overnight. However, overall electrical demand is lower at night than during the daytime, and Toronto Hydro staff did not consider high night time temperatures to be as significant a concern as high daytime temperatures or heat waves from an electrical system point of view (Workshop 2).

High temperatures above 40°C, average temperatures over 30°C on a 24h basis, heat waves and high night time temperatures were also judged to be a medium risk for underground and overhead feeder systems due to high electrical demand for cooling and high ambient temperatures. Cables and power transformers were the two most vulnerable parts of these feeder systems in terms of heat. Under high demand, underground conducting wires and their housing undergo thermal expansion. This affects the structural integrity of the housing by causing wear and potentially leading to microfractures that are susceptible to water infiltration. Underground cables laid in close proximity or side by side, as is the case for underground feeders in the denser Former Toronto area, are also

more susceptible to these expansion effects than underground feeders in the horseshoe area. Adjacent cables tend to heat one another up, and the increased heat reduces the cables' electrical transmission capacity. In overhead systems, cables under high demand will also lead to cable expansion and conductor sag. While this sag is generally accounted for in tree trimming and object clearance around power lines, excessive sag may be more prone to contacting objects and causing an electrical fault.

Feeder system power transformers are affected in a similar manner as their station counterparts. High ambient temperatures place additional demand from air-conditioning on transformers, while also affecting their ability to effectively cool. Overheating overhead transformers may fail or catch fire and will have to be replaced. In terms of relative risk, it should be noted that an overheating feeder line power transformer is less critical than an overheating station transformer, as the former serves fewer clients than the latter.

Underground dual radial, URD, compact loop and network systems afford increasing levels of redundancy for clients, due to their ability to supply electricity in the event of an outage through a different branch, loop or conduit of the feeder system. In this study, dual radial and URD feeders in the Former Toronto area were considered to be less able to cope with high electrical demand and mitigate outages than similar electrical feeder types in the horseshoe area. This is due to the fact that feeders in the Former Toronto area are already under high base load (denser environment), their equipment is generally older and cables running side by side increase the heat load and reduce their maximum capacity. Therefore, underground feeders in the Former Toronto area are considered to be slightly more at risk (+1 severity) to heat impacts as compared with similar feeder types in the horseshoe area.

Overhead feeder systems were judged to be slightly more at risk (+1 to +2 severity) than underground systems to temperatures above 40°C and to average temperatures above 30°C on a 24h basis. While electrical load demands may be similar for underground and overhead transformers, direct solar radiation and exposure to high ambient air temperatures can reduce the ability of overhead transformers to disperse heat. On the other hand, overhead transformers were judged to be less vulnerable to high night time temperatures than underground systems, due to increased circulation of cooler nighttime air around overhead transformers as compared to those located in underground vaults.

High ambient air temperatures were also judged to be medium-low risks for protection and control systems. Like station batteries, high temperatures will degrade the expected lifespan of batteries used to power the feeder protection and control systems in the event of a power failure.

Extreme Rainfall

The most significant medium risks from extreme rainfall events are related to the flooding of non-submersible vault-type electrical components kept below grade. Vaults below grade are usually equipped with either passive drainage systems or active pumping drainage systems to keep them from flooding. However, under extreme rainfall conditions, it is possible that the sewers to which these drainage systems are connected may themselves be at capacity, and without the ability to evacuate the water, some vaults may flood. In flooded vaults, non-submersible electrical equipment could be damaged, and an outage may occur. This is also a concern in some network type feeders in downtown Toronto, where old network protection equipment are not housed in submersible enclosures. Toronto Hydro is gradually installing submersible equipment in all below-grade vaults, but non-submersible equipment is still expected to be in present by the end of the study period. Furthermore, the equipment in flooded vaults cannot be accessed until the water is evacuated, creating a delay in responding to electrical incidents.

While not exclusively a problem related to heavy rainfall events, water infiltration into the ground and moisture around underground cables can lead to water treeing[20] and cracking of cable insulation. Deterioration of cable housing could lead to electrical faults if cracks become sufficiently large to allow ground moisture to serve as a pathway for electricity to ground.

[20] Tears in the cable's insulating layer caused by the presence of moisture and an alternating current's (AC) electric field.

It was noted in the workshop that extreme rainfall can be beneficial to overhead feeder systems. Salt residues from the wintertime and dust throughout the year can accumulate on electrical insulators. Moist conditions such as fog, mist or light rainfall can cause these accumulations to serve as conduits to ground, causing flashovers and potential pole fires and outages. Heavy rainfall events, especially in the early spring, are in fact beneficial for washing off the salt and dirt residues from insulators. Note that 27.6 kV and 13.8 kV lines are more prone to flashovers due to their higher voltages. It was noted in the workshop that 27.6 kV systems in particular may require more frequent cleaning than is currently the case in order to prevent flashovers, while flashovers do not tend to occur with 4.16 kV equipment.

High Winds

High winds over 70 km/h (but less than 90 km/h) were considered a medium risk to overhead power lines. While lines and poles are designed to withstand such wind speeds, it has been found that tree branches may begin to break at these thresholds and fall onto lines. Overhead conductors may also flail in the wind and contact branches. At the least, these tree contacts may cause momentary interruptions to electrical service. At the worst, tree branches and limbs may fall on and damage or sever power lines, potentially causing outages, fires and public safety hazards.

Lightning

Lightning strikes on overhead feeder systems was rated as a medium risk. Lightning arrestors installed on overhead power lines are designed to direct lightning surge currents to ground and protect pole mounted equipment such as transformers, switches and SCADA equipment. However, failure of the lightning arrestors can result in damaged equipment from lightning strikes and potentially lead to a localized outage.

Human Resources

Most of the human resource interactions with climate parameters (high heat, heavy precipitation, 15 mm of freezing rain, high wind, tornadoes, lightning and snowfall) were judged to be of medium risk. High heat conditions can make it dangerous to work on outdoor and overhead equipment for extended periods of time. For underground systems, high ambient temperatures can exacerbate hot conditions in vaults (heated by transformer operation), thereby also making it unsafe to work on equipment for extended periods of time. Workers tend to defer work under high heat conditions until temperatures above ground or within vaults cool sufficiently to allow safe continuous access. This may however cause a delay in the response to incidents on the electrical system.

Heavy precipitation, freezing rain and snowfall may make it difficult for all employees to travel to and from work, while also making it dangerous for field workers to get to equipment. During severe events such as high winds, tornadoes and lightning, workers apply their judgement and generally delay accessing equipment until the severe weather event has passed. Interestingly, the severity scoring of high winds at 70 km/h were slightly higher than scores for higher wind speeds (90 km/h, 120 km/h or tornadoes). This is because unsafe work conditions are very clear under extreme high wind events. However, at lower wind speeds, work conditions may appear to be acceptable, and workers may decide that the threat is reasonable given the need to restore electrical service. However, sudden, abrupt wind gusts could momentarily jeopardize worker safety.

As Toronto Hydro has occupational health and safety policies and procedures in place, the consequence of severe weather on workers tends to be delaying access and work on equipment until weather conditions, road access improves, and worksites are declared to be safe.

5.3 High Risk Interactions

The highest risks found in this study are related to structural damage and failure of electrical systems and components. In general, station equipment and overhead feeder systems were the two main system infrastructure categories susceptible to climate interactions that yield high risk interactions.

High Temperature

Days with peak temperatures above 40°C and days where average ambient temperatures exceed 30°C on a 24h basis are the two significant climate parameters rated as high risk for transmission and municipal stations. Days with peak temperatures above 40°C are currently a very rare occurrence, but are expected to occur on an almost annual basis by the 2030's and on an annual basis by the 2050's. Similarly, high ambient temperatures exceeding 30°C on a 24h basis are currently a rare occurrence, but may occur on an annual basis by the 2050's. In both cases, high electrical demand, coupled with loss of cooling efficiency, will cause station power transformers to overheat. In the most severe of cases, demand cannot be maintained without damaging station power transformers, which have an average replacement cost of around $500 K[21]. A coping mechanism employed by electrical utilities is to shed electrical load (load shedding), which entails instituting temporary outages in various sectors of the city in order to reduce load demand. For buildings and residents dependent on air-conditioning for cooling purposes, this represents a significant public health risk at a time of extreme heat events.

This high risk is especially relevant for transmission and municipal stations with low excess capacity by the 2030's and 2050's. As such, during periods of high demand, these stations have less excess capacity with which to meet electrical demand.

Freezing Rain and Ice Storms

There are three significant thresholds to consider for freezing rain and ice storm effects on the electrical distribution system. First, preliminary forensic analyses of outages from freezing rain indicate that 15+ mm of freezing rain is a trigger for the breaking of tree branches and limbs. These pose a threat to overhead feeder systems, and these freezing rain amounts have resulted in widespread outages in Toronto in the past due to tree contacts. The next threshold is 25 mm of freezing rain, which is the CSA design requirement for overhead electrical systems. Theoretically, overhead feeder systems, as well as the overhead exit lines at stations are supposed to withstand 25 mm of freezing rain (12.5 mm of radial ice accretion). However, such quantities of freezing rain and ice accretion on overhead infrastructure bring them to their structural design limits, which are further exacerbated by breaking tree branches and wind. Finally at 60 mm of freezing rain, the weight of ice accretion on overhead lines and station exit lines exceeds their design limit, and will likely cause them to collapse.

It should be noted that the high risk ratings for 15 mm and 25 mm of freezing rain on overhead feeder systems and station exit lines is based on probability of occurrence for the study period (probability scores of 7, event will occur during the study period)[22]. From an annual probability perspective, freezing rain events at 15mm and 25mm of freezing rain would actually result in medium risk ratings. As can be seen from Table 3-2 in Chapter 3, the current annual probability of occurrence of 15 mm of freezing rain is 0.11 days / year (1 in 9 year return period), and is projected to increase to 0.16 days / year (1 in 6 year return period) by the 2050's. The current annual probability of 25 mm of freezing rain is 0.06 days / year (1 in 17 year return period), and is projected to increase to 0.09 days per / year (1 in 11 year return period) by the 2050's.As the projected trend for 15 mm and 25 mm freezing rain events is increasing in the future, the interaction of these two climate parameters with overhead feeder systems and station exit lines are maintained as a high risk.

Similarly, it was found that 60 mm freezing rain events would actually fall into a medium risk category (study period probability of 4, annual probability of 1, severity score of 7). However, major ice storms are part of a pattern of risk that is similar to 25 mm freezing rain events. For this reason, it is maintained in the high risk category

High Winds

High winds and wind gusts at 90 km/h and 120 km/h were judged to be a high risk to overhead feeder systems. These wind speeds reach and exceed the design limits of conductor connections to support poles, and the poles

[21] Estimate provided through correspondence with Toronto Hydro staff.
[22] A comparison for freezing rain/ice storm lasting at least 6hr+ based on annual probability versus study period probability does not change the high risk rating.

themselves. Further compounding impacts is the potential for flying debris, such as broken tree branches and limbs, to further bring down overhead feeder systems.

The threats from high winds and gusts above 120 km/h were judged to be high risk due to wind forces on station overhead exit lines (exceeding design standard for poles). Furthermore, there is the potential for flying debris to damage station equipment at outdoor stations.

As is the case for freezing rain, it should be noted that the high risk ratings wind over 120 km/h were on overhead feeder systems and station exit lines is based on probability of occurrence for the study period (probability scores of 7, event will occur during the study period)[23]. However, from an annual probability perspective, events producing 120 km/h high winds would actual result in low and medium-low risk ratings for station and overhead feeder systems respectively. This is because the current annual probability of 120 km/h wind events is 0.05 days per year (1 in 20 year return period). This frequency is expected to increase during the study horizon, although the projected value is not known. These significant wind events are similar to the case of tornadoes, in that they are infrequent but can lead to significant damage to large areas of the distribution system if they occur (low probability, high severity events). As they are however expected to be more frequent than tornadoes, the 120 km/h wind – overhead systems interaction is maintained as high risk in this study.

Lightning

Lightning strikes on station equipment, notably power transformers, were rated as a high risk. Lightning arrestors at stations are designed to direct lightning surge currents to ground and protect electrical equipment. However, failure of the lightning arrestors can result in damaged equipment from lightning strikes and potentially causing an outage to an entire service area.

Human Resources

Heavy freezing rain events constitute a high risk for Toronto Hydro personnel. First, slippery surfaces make travel to and from work, and out to worksites dangerous for field crews. Second, field crews also have to contend with a layer of ice over electrical equipment, trees, and other overhead structures such as buildings. As such, the risk of injury to workers from freezing rain events remain even after the storm has passed due to the continuous ice loads on overhead power lines and trees, which may cause them to break without warning.

5.4 Special Cases – High Severity, Low Probability Events

Tornadoes

Tornadoes represent a high severity, low probability event. As mentioned in Chapter 3, while the likelihood of a tornado event touching down at a specific point or location is extremely small, the likelihood of a tornado occurring somewhere in the City of Toronto over study period (2015 – 2050) is in fact considerable. Furthermore, due to the lake breeze effect, northern portions of the city tend to have a high probability of seeing a tornado event, although it does not preclude an occurrence closer to the lakeshore. Tornadoes were judged to have catastrophic consequences on all above ground infrastructure, while underground infrastructure may become inaccessible due to windblown debris.

[23] A comparison for freezing rain/ice storm lasting at least 6hr+ based on annual probability versus study period probability does not change the high risk rating.

5.6 Special Cases – Low Severity, High Probability Events

Snowfall and freezing rain

The degradation of concrete and corrosion of steel materials (at grade and underground feeder systems) is a case of high probability, low severity events. These processes are accelerated by the application of de-icing salts during snowfall and freezing rain events. The application of salts can accelerate the corrosion of metal housing and enclosures of electrical equipment, resulting in shorter lifespans. It also affects the steel and concrete of vaults and cable chambers (civil equipment). Future warming associated with climate change is expected to decrease the number of days without snowfall, but the trend for freezing rain is expected to increase. Nonetheless, snowfall is expected to continue to be an annual event throughout the time horizon of this study. As such, degradation of civil structures will continue to be an issue for Toronto Hydro over the study period.

Underground electrical feeder equipment and civil structures located in the Former Toronto area received a slightly (+1) higher severity rating (and a medium-low risk rating) because the infrastructure is generally older than those found in the horseshoe area. It was found that older equipment and structures are more susceptible to degradation if corrosion had already begun (e.g. protective layers of paint may be worn off). Furthermore, older equipment may not be as resistant to corrosion as newer equipment due to the advancement of enclosure design and testing over time (Nema standard).

Some of this salt is dispersed by the moisture in the air, and can accumulate through the winter season on insulators on poles. These salt accumulations can cause electrical short circuits that could result in pole fires. Loop feeder systems are judged to be of lower risk than radial systems in the event of a short circuit or fire due to the potential to provide power temporarily through another loop of the feeder.

5.7 Mapping Risk Results

The mapping of risks provides complementary information to the risk assessment matrix, and facilitates a spatial understanding of low, medium and high risk interactions, and vulnerabilities (i.e. the medium and high risk interactions). For example, maps can provide an indication of the areas of vulnerability of overhead and underground infrastructure with respect to different kinds of weather events. Furthermore, the mapping exercise actually provides a new set of information on how vulnerabilities stemming from stations can combine with vulnerabilities to feeder systems. In some cases, vulnerabilities stem primarily from station assets (e.g. 120km/h wind and underground feeder assets), while in other cases, both station and feeder vulnerabilities to weather events contribute to an area of greater vulnerability within the city (i.e. freezing rain affecting both station and overhead feeder assets). The following section provides some spatial observations about the four climate parameters affecting electrical distribution infrastructure. All mapping results are provided in **Appendix E**.

Figure 5-1 Risk Map, High Temperature Above 40°C, 2050's



Vulnerabilities from high heat events stem primarily from projected available station capacity by the 2050s, as this study did not find that vulnerabilities varied significantly (all rated medium risk) for feeder assets. Vulnerabilities to high heat events are more heavily concentrated in the Former Toronto area, although several horseshoe area stations would also be vulnerable during high heat events (Figure 5-1).

In terms of potential heavy rainfall risks to Toronto Hydro infrastructure, underground feeder systems that may be subject to flooding are located largely in the Former Toronto area and northeastern sections of the horseshoe (Figure 5-2). Some transmission station service areas in the Former Toronto area are marked as low risk due to the presence of some switchgear equipment that will likely remain in basements through the study period. Note however that sump pumps in stations make the probability of flood damage in stations from heavy precipitation less likely.

Figure 5-2 Risk Map, Extreme Rainfall, 100 mm in less than 24h, 2050's



Toronto Hydro has a significant quantity of overhead distribution systems which are at vulnerable to extreme freezing rain, ice storms, high wind and tornado events. These feeder vulnerabilities combine with the fact that stations in the horseshoe area have station exit lines that are outdoors. This combination makes certain portions of the horseshoe particularly vulnerable to heavy freezing rain events and ice storm. Figure 5-3 shows the areas of vulnerability stemming from 25 mm of freezing rain, and is indicative of extreme precipitation/wind related vulnerabilities to overhead systems across Toronto.

Figure 5-3 Risk Map, 25 mm Freezing Rain, 2050's



Lightning strike vulnerabilities are largely concentrated in the horseshoe area, where both outdoor station equipment and overhead feeder systems are predominant. However, overhead feeder systems in the the Former Toronto area are also vulnerable (Figure 5-4).

Figure 5-4 Risk Map, Electrical Distribution Systems Potentially Affected by Lightning Strikes



There are several caveats that should be mentioned with respect to interpreting mapping results, due in large part to the fact that risk ratings were evaluated based on general system characteristics. Localized site characteristics that may mitigate or worsen risk ratings were not adequately captured in the mapping exercise. They include:

- Local geographic characteristics, assets and features. There may be local site characteristics such the tree canopy cover, types of trees, presence of buildings or other overhead structures, which may exacerbate weather events (e.g. wind) or shelter infrastructure from impacts. The presence of low lying areas (e.g. bowls, flood plains) was also not considered. This level of detail, provided by a full site inspection and digital terrain mapping, were not available for this project. Such information would be useful in refining the risk ratings and mapping for extreme rainfall, freezing rain and wind;

- Areas with lower drainage capacity due to configuration of city storm drainage infrastructure. This type of information requires a very detailed understanding of city infrastructure, which was not available for this study. Furthermore, this level of data is most useful when combined with digital terrain mapping in order to identify low lying areas with problematic drainage. Finally, future projections as to how city infrastructure might evolve over time were also not available for this project;

- The moderating effect of Lake Ontario. As noted in Chapter 3, the lake can play a significant role in influencing temperature and humidity along the lakeshore. For example, the lake effect can moderate temperatures during heat waves and can reduce the possibilities of freezing rain or snow falling on areas closer to the lakeshore. The extent and intensity of the lake effect can vary depending on the event and weather conditions. It was not possible to estimate the geographic extent of the lake effect, or by how much the probability scoring for certain climate parameters may be affected. As such, the lake effect's moderating influence was not taken into account sufficiently in the risk assessment and mapping exercise;

- Local electrical configurations and characteristics. There are likely cases where location specific electrical equipment may make certain feeder or station systems inherently more robust or redundant than would be the case of the general class of equipment. For example, additional feeder ties, loops or circuits could make certain feeders more redundant in the event of a downed power line. The age of equipment, their future replacement schedule will also have an effect on their risk rating. This level of detail is not captured at level of analysis undertaken in this study;

- For the extreme rainfall risk map, it should be noted that the mapping of transmission stations includes all stations. Information identifying the location of the stations whose batteries and switchgear are located below grade was not available. Further analysis is required to identify the precise locations of transmission with below grade assets in order to get a better mapping of flood related risks.

In spite of these shortcomings, the mapping exercise represents a useful first approximation of spatial nature of electrical system vulnerabilities to climate change. Furthermore, this mapping information can be more easily combined with other layers of information such as technical hazard information (e.g. flood mapping), physical locations (e.g. emergency resource centres, hospitals, transportation networks) and social vulnerability indices (e.g. age, income, population density, etc.) from other sources (e.g. TRCA, City of Toronto) to produce further mapping studies and in depth analyses to suit the needs of other policy makers.

6 Engineering Analysis

This chapter presents the results of the Step 4 of the Protocol, the Engineering Analysis. The purpose of Engineering Analysis is to conduct a further assessment of the system-climate interactions that were rated as a medium risk (interactions scoring between 14 and 35). For these interactions, the engineering analysis attempts to evaluate whether the infrastructure is vulnerable to a changing climate. To do so, the various factors that affect the load and the capacity of the infrastructure for the study time horizon are calculated. However, quantitative calculations of load and capacity were not always possible to make due to a lack of data to support such an analysis. For this reason, professional judgment is also applied in the engineering analysis. Infrastructure which is found to be vulnerable is passed to Step 5, while those which were not were discarded from further consideration.

In total, nineteen medium risk interactions were analyzed. Fifteen of them were deemed vulnerable and passed to Step 5, while 4 were discarded from further analysis. The following table summarizes the results of the engineering analysis. A brief description of the reasoning behind the results for each of the medium risk interactions is presented in this chapter, while the full engineering analysis can be found in **Appendix G.**

Table 6-1 Engineering Analysis Results

	Affected infrastructure	Climate Parameter	Further Action Recommended
	Municipal and Transmission Stations and Communications Systems		
1.	Transmission and municipal stations	High temperature above 25°C and above 30°C	Yes
	Protection and control systems	All temperatures	
2.	Transmission stations	High temperature above 35°C	Yes
3.	Transmission stations	High temperature above 40°C and average temperature > 30°C	Yes
4.	Transmission stations	Heat wave and high nighttime temperatures	Yes
5.	Transmission and municipal stations	Freezing rain, ice Storm 60 mm	Yes
6.	Municipal stations	High temperature	Yes
		Underground and Overhead Feeders	
7.	Underground feeders	High temperature maximum above 35°C & above 40°C, average temp >30°C, heat wave and high nighttime	Yes
8.	Underground feeders	Extreme rainfall	a. Feeders/water treeing: Yes b. Nun submersible vault: Yes c. Above ground stations: No d. N/W feeders: Yes
9.	Padmount stations	High winds 120 km/h	No
10.	Overhead feeders (radial and loop)	High temperature maximum above 35°C & above 40°C, average temp >30°C and heat wave	Yes
11.	Overhead feeders (radial)	High nighttime temperatures	No
12.	Overhead feeders (loop)	Freezing rain, ice Storm 15 mm	Yes
13.	Overhead feeders (radial and loop)	Freezing rain, ice Storm 60 mm	Yes
14.	Overhead feeders (radial and open loop) and SCADA system	Lightning	Yes
15.	Overhead feeders (radial)	Snow > 5 cm and snow > 10 cm	No
		Civil Structures	
16.	Civil structures: underground feeders (Former Toronto)	Extreme rainfall, freezing rain/ice storm 15 mm & 25 mm & 6hrs+ (combination of events)	Yes
17.	Civil Structures: underground feeders (Former Toronto)	Snow > 5 cm and snow > 10 cm	No, but combinations of climates need additional study.
18.	Civil structures	Frost	Yes
19.	Human resources	All climate parameters	Yes

6.1 Municipal and Transmission Stations and Communications Systems

1. High temperature above 25°C and above 30°C / transmission and municipal stations and all Temperatures / protection and control systems

Further action recommended. Under higher temperatures, battery life expectancy (e.g. around 10 years) may decrease. Toronto Hydro has already encountered problems with some batteries failing prior to their expected lifespan..

2. High temperature above 35°C / transmission stations

Further action recommended, conclusions for high temperature and power transformers also apply (see Chapter 7). Transmission station designers will need to take into account the significant increase in days with maximum temperatures above 35°C, which reduces station capacity while, on the other hand, experiences an increased load demand. At the moment, no load growth rate for the period of this study was estimated. The recommendations given in Chapter 7 for transmission stations and maximum temperature above 40°C / average temp above 30°C also apply to this interaction.

3. High temperature above 40°C and average temperature > 30°C / transmission stations

Further action recommended. Most of the transmission stations considered in this study were judged to be vulnerable (high risk rating) to high temperatures. The stations in the Horseshoe received a medium-high risk score (35) due to the application of the concept of excess capacity, which is qualitative and notional (refer to the **Appendix F**). As such, it is recommended that transmission stations receiving a medium-high risk score be considered vulnerable to extreme high temperatures as part of a consistent pattern of risk. This will also help Toronto Hydro to adopt a consistent approach in the design, operations and maintenance of stations.

4. Heat wave (+30°C) and high nighttime temperatures (+23°C) / transmission stations

Further action recommended. Power transformers are vital equipment in the distribution of electricity and high temperatures have a significant impact on the capacity of the transformers. For these reasons, the conclusion of this report for temperature above 40°C and for high daily average temperature > 30°C are also relevant to the heat wave and high nighttime temperature parameters.

5. Freezing rain/ice storm 60 mm ≈ 30 mm radial (major outages) / transmission stations and municipal stations

Further action recommended. This interaction is part of a similar pattern of vulnerability as 25 mm freezing rain events. Therefore, solutions for 25 mm events are also relevant to mitigating heavy freezing rain events of ~ 60 mm.

6. High temperature (+35°C,+ 40°C, average temperature > 30°C, heat wave, high nighttime temperatures) / municipal stations

Further action recommended. High temperature and combinations of high temperature, high average temperature, high nighttime temperature and high load demand will have consequences on the capacity of the power transformers and cables.

6.2 Underground and Overhead Feeders

7. High temperature maximum above 35°C & above 40°C, average temp >30°C, heat wave and high nighttime / underground feeders

Further action recommended. Toronto Hydro replaces cables based on asset life replacement cycles or premature failures. However, it is projected that climate change related high temperatures could create higher

demand for cooling, and may place greater stress on cables and lead to increasing occurrences of cable failures. Therefore, high heat impacts on cable was deemed to be a vulnerability.

8. Extreme rainfall / underground feeders

a. Feeders: Water treeing of the cables, flooding

Further action recommended. Climate change related stresses (i.e. higher temperature, higher loading, flooding from extreme rainfall) will continue to stress underground cables and constitute a vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

b. Non-submersible equipment failure in vault type stations below ground in the Horseshoe Area (Former Toronto has a high risk result)

Further action recommended. While Toronto Hydro is gradually replacing vault type non-submersible equipment with submersible versions, non-submersible vault type equipment is likely to remain in the system over the study period.

c. Above ground vault stations, access to the vault station and to the station equipment could be limited due to localized flooding of streets around the vault station, or at the station itself

No further action required. This impact does not relate to station load or capacity. The consequence is that the access to the vault stations or the stations equipment could be temporarily impeded. Impact is localized and temporary, and was not judged to warrant further action beyond current practices.

d. Network feeders: old N/W protectors are not submersible

Further action recommended. The old N/W protector may not operate properly if flooded. However, failure of the N/W protector will not automatically result in an interruption to the customer, since network systems are highly redundant. Toronto Hydro is installing new N/W protectors that are submersible, but there may still be older non-submersible N/W protectors in the systems, particularly in downtown over the study period. Further study could be undertaken to evaluate the cost of replacing old network protectors prior to the end of their expected lifecycle against the frequency and consequence of old N/W protectors being flooded.

9. High winds (120 km/h) / padmount stations on distribution network (Former Toronto)

No further action required. The damaged equipment will result in an overall or some loss of service capacity and function. However, it is judged that flying debris is too much of a random occurrence to warrant further action.

10. High temperature maximum above 35°C & above 40°C, average temp >30°C and heat wave / Overhead power lines (radial and loop)

Further action recommended. Higher temperatures will have impacts on the overall capacity of the power lines. In the downtown area, there are critical, constrained areas (i.e. built up zones) where added conductor/transformer capacity may be difficult to implement.

11. High nighttime temperatures / Overhead power lines (radial)

No further action required. Night time temperatures with minimum ≥ 23°C in and of itself is not a significant concern for Toronto Hydro in terms of electrical service provision as peak demand has subsided. However, it is important to note that high daily temperatures in combination with high night time temperatures are a concern. This has been considered under different climate-infrastructure interaction, average temperature over 30°C on a 24 h basis, so this particular interaction does not warrant further action.

12. Freezing rain - ice Storm 15 mm and high winds 70 km/h / Overhead feeders in loop configuration

Further action recommended. The risk assessment of radial systems resulted in a high risk rating for this interaction. In overhead loop systems, it was hypothesized that their more redundant configuration would reduce customer interruptions, affect fewer clients or cause outages of shorter durations, thus yielding a high-medium risk rating of 35. However, the frequency of freezing rain events are projected to increase slightly by the end of the study horizon compared to present day (see table 3-2). The tree canopy may also be weakened by increased disease threats. Finally, freezing rain events tend to be widespread, and there is no reason to believe that both branches of an overhead loop circuit might not be equally susceptible to damage. For all of these reasons, all overhead power lines, irrespective of electrical configuration, were deemed as vulnerable.

13. Freezing rain/ice storm 60 mm ≈ 30 mm radial (major outages) / overhead lines (radial and loop)

Further action recommended. See explanation for freezing rain and stations (item 5 above).

14. Lightning / overhead power lines (radial and open loop) and SCADA system

Further action recommended. It is difficult to predict the increase of lightning strikes for the study period; however it is interesting to note that the probability of a lightning strike in an area of 0,015 km^2 anywhere within the City of Toronto is very high for the study period. At the moment, lightning strike intensity, the number of lightning arrestors/km and arrestor performance are not monitored by Toronto Hydro. Given this uncertainty, and since lightning strikes are currently a frequent source of outages, lightning strikes were judged to be a continued vulnerability.

15. Snow > 5 cm and snow > 10 cm / overhead power lines (radial)

No further action required. The number of snow days is highly variable. The trend seems to be decreasing, but snow days will still occur annually. During the workshop, Toronto Hydro mentioned having problems regarding insulator tracking leading to pole fires especially at higher voltages (13.8 kV and 27.6 kV) and switch failures. However, Toronto Hydro is already monitoring and dealing with this issue.

6.3 Civil Structures

16. Extreme rainfall, freezing rain/ice storm 15 mm & 25 mm & 6hrs+ (combination of events) / civil structures: underground feeders (Former Toronto)

Further action recommended. Vaults and chambers already suffering from degradation issues will deteriorate more rapidly over time. From THESL (Toronto Hydro, 2014a): *As below-grade structures age, the greatest concern becomes structural strength. Structural deficiencies affecting vaults include degradation of concrete and corrosion of supports such as beams and rebar. Once degradation and corrosion sets in, conditions can deteriorate rapidly and in many cases from one season to the next. Of particular concern is the winter season when moisture and water enter in below-*grade *structures, freezes and thaws, and carries with it salt that has been used at grade to melt ice and snow.*

While maintenance can reduce the rate of deterioration, incidence of extreme rainfall, snowfall, freezing rain and the application of road salt will persist throughout the study period and continue to contribute to the premature aging of civil structures. While, it could not be determined in the study whether premature aging of civil structures will be exacerbated by a changing climate, this issue will persist over the study period and is therefore judged as an on-going vulnerability

17. Snow > 5 cm and snow > 10 cm / civil structures: underground feeders (Former Toronto)

No further action required, but combinations of climates events require additional study. As days with snow will probably decrease, the snow days alone were not judge to be a significant vulnerability. However, snow days will still occur over the study period, and in combination with extreme rainfall, freezes and thaw, freezing rain, and the continued application of road salt, premature degradation of civil structures was judged to be an

ongoing vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

18. Frost / civil structures (overhead and underground feeders)

Further action recommended. While the threat of frost is decreasing over the study period, it is noted that frost penetration will still occur with occasional extreme cold weather. Since Toronto Hydro already experiences problems with frost and its civil infrastructure, frost impacts are judged to be a vulnerability.

6.4 Human Resources

19. All climate parameters / human Resources

Further action recommended. While occupational health and safety procedures will continue to be in place in the future, human resources will continue to be vulnerable to climate change related weather events due to the need to travel, access, and work on equipment in spite of the weather.

7 Conclusions

The Phase 2 study presents a climate change based vulnerability assessment of electrical distribution infrastructure. It seeks to inform future investigations, planning and investment decisions on system and component vulnerabilities, and to support efforts to enhance the resilience of the electrical system. This chapter presents Step 5 of the Protocol and covers electrical distribution system vulnerabilities within the City of Toronto, adaptation options and areas of further study.

7.1 Vulnerabilities to a Changing Climate

The Phase 2 employed a high level risk based screening methodology to determine where infrastructure vulnerabilities to climate change may be present. All high risk infrastructure-climate parameter interactions, as well as medium risk interactions assessed as vulnerable through the engineering analysis comprise the vulnerabilities identified for Toronto Hydro's electrical distribution system to a changing climate. These vulnerabilities can be divided into five groups based on how climate parameters affect the system. The following paragraphs summarize these vulnerabilities, while table 7-1 provides more detailed information by infrastructure-climate parameter interactions.

High Ambient Temperatures – Station and Feeder Assets

High ambient temperatures create problems for the distribution system because of the compounding effect of high demand (e.g. for cooling) and high ambient temperature affecting equipment cooling and electrical transmission efficiency. Two specific climate parameters were of most significant concern, daily peak temperatures exceeding 40°C (excluding humidity) and daily average temperatures exceeding 30°C. In these cases, the climate analysis found that such extreme temperatures have occurred only rarely in the past, but are projected to occur on an almost semi-annual to annual basis by the 2030's and 2050's respectively. Through preliminary demand and supply growth projections completed for this study, these vulnerabilities were identified based on the notion that extreme heat will generate electrical demand for cooling in areas where station excess capacity is projected to be marginal. Furthermore, such temperature extremes may cause equipment, notably power transformers, to operate beyond their design specifications and increases the likelihood of failure. It is anticipated that vulnerability to high heat events will be concentrated in the Former Toronto area, although there are several horseshoe station service areas which would also be vulnerable.

Freezing Rain, Ice Storms, High Wind and Tornadoes – Overhead Station and Feeder Assets

Freezing rain, ice storms, high wind and tornado events cause immediate structural issues for overhead distribution assets, as they have the capacity to exceed the design limits of equipment and their supports. Outages may result from damage to equipment arising from direct forces applied by climate parameters (e.g. wind, weight of ice) or by other objects (e.g. tree branches, flying debris). These kinds of events affect outdoor station and feeder assets, which are largely concentrated in the horseshoe service area. It is important to emphasize that Toronto Hydro has experienced problems related to freezing rain, ice storms (up to 25 mm) and high winds (up to 90 km/h) in the past. These events are projected to continue in the future, but continue to occur on a less than annual or even decadal frequency. More severe ice storms (60 mm), high winds (over 120 km/h) and tornadoes (EF1+) have been extremely rare in the past, and while there is a lack of scientific consensus on projected future frequencies for these extreme events, they are likely to remain rare in the future. Nevertheless, the damages caused by these kinds of events can be severe. Therefore, they were judged as ongoing and future vulnerabilities for Toronto Hydro.

Extreme Rainfall – Underground Feeder Assets

Extreme rainfall events may potentially flood underground feeder assets, which are largely concentrated in the Former Toronto and northeastern horseshoe areas. Toronto Hydro is aware of these issues in relation to its

assets and has programs to replace non-submersible equipment with submersible type equipment, to relocate equipment where possible. However, due to the large quantity of underground feeder assets across the city, replacement and reinforcement of underground assets will be a gradual and ongoing activity for Toronto Hydro over the study period. As such, some underground feeder assets may remain an area of vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

Snowfall, Freezing Rain - Corrosion of Civil Structures

The degradation of civil structures (i.e. concrete and steel), which is accelerated by humidity and the presence of de-icing salts, was identified as a potential area of vulnerability to climate change. Corrosion is already an ongoing issue for Toronto Hydro and current assets have a design lifespan which accounts to a great extent for corrosion issues. However, it is not clear from this study whether the climate change stresses will exacerbate the problem. While snowfall days are generally expected to decrease with a warming climate, they will continue to occur annually through to the 2050's. As a result, and in combination with freezing rain events, the application of de-icing salts will also be applied annually through the study horizon. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that corrosion represents a long-term and on-going vulnerability for Toronto Hydro.

Lightning – Overhead Feeder Assets

Based on workshop feedback and an examination of Toronto Hydro's ITIS outage data, Toronto Hydro recognizes that lightning impacts are a significant source of outages on the distribution system today. While there have been advances in predicting lightning activity, there was insufficient data available on lightning strike intensity and arrester performance to suggest how future lighting activity may affect the electrical system. For these reasons, this study suggests that lightning activity will continue to be an area of vulnerability.

7.2 Adaptation Options

Adaptation options are suggested for all the infrastructure-climate parameter interactions identified as vulnerabilities. The Protocol classifies adaptation options in four possible categories:

- remedial engineering actions which aim to strengthen or upgrade the infrastructure;
- management actions to account for changes in the infrastructure capacity;
- continued monitoring of performance of the infrastructure and impacts; and
- further study required to address gaps in data availability and data quality.

Adaptation options by infrastructure-climate parameter interaction are presented in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1 Vulnerabilities and Adaptation Options by Infrastructure Asset, Climate Parameter

Affected infrastructure	Climate Parameter	Adaptation Option	Details
Stations, Communications and Protection Systems			
1. Transmission stations, municipal stations, protection and control systems Critical component: batteries	High temperature above 25°C	Further study required	Toronto Hydro has experienced problems with station batteries failing short of expected lifespans (i.e. approximately 10 years). Operating batteries in rooms where the ambient temperatures increases above 25°C is a contributing factor to premature battery failure (Toronto Hydro, 2014c). As battery rooms are not temperature controlled, Toronto Hydro could monitor how ambient temperatures of rooms within stations housing batteries fluctuate during the warmer summer months and evaluate whether additional measures are needed (e.g. review of battery technical specifications, including aging factor) to reduce battery degradation.

Affected infrastructure	Climate Parameter	Adaptation Option	Details
2. Transmission stations, municipal stations Critical component: power transformers	High temperature above 35°C, 40°C Average daily temperature > 30°C Heat wave High nighttime temperatures	Further study required	Given the increased frequency of high heat conditions in the future, coupled with continued demand growth, infrastructure owners (Toronto Hydro and Hydro One), could conduct a could conduct a further study evaluating the technical and financial feasibility of installing transformers with a higher capacity, or installing more transformers at stations (shared load) where space permits. Another possibility is to evaluate the technical and financial feasibility of increasing the design standard for current power transformer equipment, for example, by designing to a daily average ambient temperature higher than 30 °C (35 °C) and maximum temperature with a higher temperature than 40°C (45 °C). Finally, these measures should be complemented by continued demand side management /energy conservation programs.
3. Transmission stations: only outdoor stations 4. Municipal stations: Horseshoe area outdoor stations Critical component: Overhead exit lines (for freezing rain and high winds parameters)	Freezing rain/ice storm : 25 mm, 60 mm High winds : 120 km/h and tornadoes	Management actions and further study required .	Major freezing rain, ice storm, high wind and tornado events are not expected to be an annual occurrence in the future, but will still likely occur over the study period. Station exit lines, either overhead ones or where underground cables surface, are a particular point of vulnerability, as downed exit lines can sever power supply to the entire service area. Toronto Hydro could monitor the frequency of damage to station exit lines and poles across a range of potential weather threats (freezing rain, high winds) to evaluate whether this critical portion of the distribution network requires strengthening. Toronto Hydro could also consider a station by station study of surroundings to identify areas around stations susceptible to generating flying debris (e.g. trees, buildings). Emphasis should also be placed on optimizing the emergency response and restoration procedures to reduce system down time. Note that Toronto Hydro is already undertaking a review and enhancement where necessary of response planning, dispatching operations, prioritization of restoration activities, coordination with other utilities, response team training and preparation.
Arresters (for lightning parameter)	Lightning	Monitoring activities	Lightning events and strikes are difficult to predict, but are likely to increase in frequency and intensity. However, lightning strike intensity and arrester performance is not currently monitored. Given the importance of lightning strikes as a cause of outages, it is recommended that the lightning activities (e.g. frequency, intensity), soil resistivity (i.e. decreased soil moisture from longer and hotter summers) and impacts on the system could be more closely monitored to provide more information regarding the risks of lightning strikes. For example, where high voltage arresters are installed, counters (if not already present) could also be installed to check if a particular phase or transmission line suffers from an exceptionally high number of overvoltages leading to arrester operation. Lightning strikes on the building housing stations could be investigated to determine whether they resulted in any overvoltage impacts. If further studies on lightning activity result in a better definition of lightning characteristics and impacts, or if monitoring indicates a higher rate of failure, a review of actual design practices could be undertaken.

Affected infrastructure	Climate Parameter	Adaptation Option	Details
Feeders, Communication and Protection Systems			
5. Underground feeders Critical component: cables and power transformers	High temperature above 35°C, 40°C Average daily temperature > 30°C Heat wave High nighttime temperatures	Monitoring activities	For power transformers, see discussion above on station power transformers (see row 2). For cables, increased temperature operation tends to reduce the dielectric strength of the cables. Toronto Hydro is currently trialing cable diagnostic testing techniques as a method of detecting vulnerabilities in cables. If cable testing techniques prove reliable in detecting potential failures, Toronto Hydro could consider extending diagnostic techniques to all cables to monitor heat stress impacts on cables to evaluate whether high design standards or more frequent replacement is required.
6. Underground feeders : Submersible type Critical component: cables	Extreme rainfall: 100 mm <1 day + antecedent	Monitoring activities	The presence of water can lead to an electrical failure of the cables (water treeing) and/or reduce the dielectric strength of cables. Cable diagnostic testing can be employed to monitor the degradation of underground cables. This study also supports Toronto Hydro's program to replace and renew older cable assets with moisture and tree resistant underground conductors such as TRXLPE cables. The development of flood risk mapping, coupled with historical registry of flood related equipment failures could enhance the identification of areas for priority intervention.
7. Underground feeders: Vault type – Below ground Critical component: non-submersible equipment	Extreme rainfall: 100 mm <1 day + antecedent	Remedial engineering actions	Toronto Hydro is currently upgrading non-submersible equipment located in below grade vaults with submersible equipment, or relocating them above grade. The development of flood risk mapping, coupled with historical registry of flood related equipment failures could enhance the identification of areas for priority intervention.
8. Underground feeders: 13.8 kV Network systems	Extreme rainfall: 100 mm <1 day + antecedent	Remedial engineering actions	Many old network protectors are not submersible, particularly in the downtown area. The current Toronto Hydro standard is to use submersible network protectors when replacing old equipment. Further study could be undertaken to evaluate the benefit and cost of replacing old network protectors prior to their end of life versus replacement at their end of life (i.e. potential for flood damage and outages prior to replacement).
9. Overhead feeders (Radial and loop) Critical component: power transformers and conductors	High temperature above 35°C High temperature maximum above 40°C Average daily temperature > 30°C Heat wave	Monitoring activities	Climate change is projected to increase the frequency of high heat conditions in the future. Coupled with continued demand growth, this is projected to increase heat stresses on overhead distribution feeder assets. However, unlike the case with station transformers, where projected heat and capacity reveal a clear vulnerability in terms of supply capacity, it is not clear whether high temperatures will have the same impact across the distribution feeder system (i.e. are there bottlenecks to supplying electricity during periods of high heat at certain stations or across the grid?). Toronto Hydro should continue to monitor key grid operational indicators for distribution transformers, such as load currents, billing data, transformer oil and ambient temperatures. This information can be used to help evaluate whether distribution line capacities are sufficient to handle increased electrical loads.
10. Overhead feeders (Radial and loop) Critical component: conductors	Freezing Rain/Ice storm: 15 mm and high winds 70 km/h	Management actions and remedial engineering actions	Toronto Hydro is already experiencing outages caused by tree contacts and is planning to increase its vegetation management activities. This study supports the need for increased tree trimming practices around overhead power lines and use of tree proof conductors in areas where outages due to tree contacts have been frequent.
11. Overhead : Radial and Loop Critical component: poles	Freezing rain/ice storm: 25 mm High winds: 90 km/h and 120 km/h, tornadoes	Management actions and further study required	See recommendations for stations above on freezing rain and tornadoes (see row 3).

Affected infrastructure	Climate Parameter	Adaptation Option	Details
12. Overhead power lines (radial and open loop) and SCADA system	Lightning	Monitoring activities	See recommendations for stations above on lighting (see row 3).
Civil structures			
13. Civil structures: Underground feeders (Former Toronto)	Extreme rainfall, freezing rain/ice storm 15 mm & 25 mm & 60 mm (combination of events)	Further study required	While maintenance can mitigate the risks of civil structures deterioration, changing climate conditions (e.g. freezing rain, rainfall, freeze-thaw) may exacerbate premature degradation issues. However, it could not be determined in this study whether current design standards are sufficient to withstand future climate - salt and moisture related degradation. Further study could be undertaken to estimate salt/moisture corrosion effects in relation to climate change.
14. Civil structures: transmission and municipal stations, underground feeders	Frost	Further study required	The nature of the frost heave impacts to civil structures was not sufficiently evaluated within this study. Further study can be undertaken to identify whether there are any specific location, ground condition and structure combinations which contribute to frost heave impacts.
Human Resources			
15. Human Resources	Heat, freezing rain, wind and tornadoes	Management actions	Toronto Hydro applies an occupational health and safety manual. Toronto Hydro is already conducting a review of its procedures in light of future extreme events to determine whether modifications in procedure or training are needed.

7.3 Other Areas of Study

Additional climate and infrastructure related areas of further study that can be used to enhance the understanding of electrical system vulnerabilities to climate change are listed below.

Climate

- Increase monitoring of important climate parameters across the city. For both the climate assessments and forensic analyses, a lack of observational data made understanding climate risk challenging and introduced uncertainties, particularly for specific climate parameters such as wind gusts, hourly rainfall measurements, and freezing precipitation accumulations. New monitoring would provide important benefits, including:
    - Addressing gaps in historical data;
    - Facilitating comparisons between sites across the city;
    - Improving the spatial resolution of the climate monitoring network, increasing the likelihood of capturing important meteorological events; and,
    - Providing additional data to assist in detecting new and emerging trends sooner than would be possible using the current network.
- Enhance details about weather impacts contained in the ITIS database. Although information contained within the database was extremely useful and yielded important insights, there were still gaps in the details of weather related outages which limited the evaluation of impacts;
- Refine and expand forensic investigations (see **Appendix C**) completed in this Phase 2 study. Several climate parameters, individual climate events and impacts were not investigated thoroughly due to the scope of the present study. In particular, further analyses could be done on:
    - Lake modified air and lake breeze influences on atmospheric hazards, especially extreme temperatures, ice accretion events, and severe thunderstorms (including extreme rainfall, downbursts/microbursts, and tornadoes);
    - December 2013 ice storm and other ice accretion events, particularly to help refine understanding of apparent variations in impacts between different sections of the city.

  - Temperature gradients across the city during periods of extreme heat. For example, why do some days show greater temperature gradients across the city than others, and what impact does this have on the system?
- Monitor and study the complex interaction between changes in tree growth, pest and disease conditions and resultant changes in risk to overhead systems. This could include investigating
  - The extent to which accelerated tree growth affects tree strength, and specifically resistance to wind and ice accretion loading;
  - Emerging and/or worsening tree pest and disease conditions which could reasonably be expected within the City of Toronto in the coming decades, and what potential changes in risk these will pose to overhead systems.

Infrastructure

- Site specific electrical configuration and area characteristics were not collected due to the scope of this study and scale of infrastructure system being analyzed (e.g. land use changes, high rise and condo development, population growth, terrain elevation, sewers, storm sewers, roads, tree canopy and tree type, buildings). Specific site characteristics, equipment age, or unique or uncommon equipment can alter sensitivity and vulnerabilities. Further study approaches could adopt a smaller spatial scale (e.g. station service areas, neighbourhoods) to reduce these scope and level of effort challenges and identify more site specific vulnerabilities;
- The scope of study and level of effort did not permit a detailed analysis of system performance and outage management (i.e. simulations of power rerouting or contingencies under different outage scenarios to various parts of the system). Further study approaches could adopt a smaller spatial scale (e.g. station service areas, neighbourhoods) to reduce these scope and level of effort challenges and permit a more detailed study and understanding of system performance and outage management;
- Smart Grid Data: Toronto Hydro has recently begun collecting information about outages from its grid based on smart grid feedback. Data history was short and not reviewed in this analysis. Further study examining smart grid data can be used to identify problem areas due to high load demand.

8 Bibliography

AECOM and RSI. (2012). *Toronto Hydro-Electric System Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Assessment Pilot Case Study.* Toronto: Clean Air Partnership.

Brooks, H. A., Carbin, G. W., & Marsh, P. T. (2014). Increased Variability of Tornado Occurence in the United States. *Science, 346*, 349-352.

Cheng, C. S. (2014). Evidence form the Historical Record to Support Projection of Future Wind Regimes: An Application to Canada. *Atmosphere-Ocean, 52*(3), 232-241.

Cheng, C. S., Li, G., & Auld, H. (2011). Possible Impacts of Climate Change on Freezing Rain Using Downscaled Future Climate Scenarios: Updated for Eastern Canada. *Atmosphere-Ocean, 49*(1), 8-21.

Cheng, C. S., Li, G., Li, Q., Auld, H., & Fu, C. (2012, May). Possible Impacts of Climate Change on Wind Gusts under Downscaled Future Climate Conditions over Ontario, Canada. *Journal of Climate, 25*(9), 3390-3408.

City of Toronto. (2014). *Toronto Facts*. Retrieved December 16, 2014, from www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=57a12cc817453410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD

City of Toronto. (2014). *Toronto Facts: Geography*. Retrieved December 16, 2014, from http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=1d66f937de453410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=57a12cc817453410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD

CSA. (2010a). *C22.3 No. 1-10 Overhead Systems.* Mississauga, ON: Canadian Standards Association.

CSA. (2010b). *CAN/CSA-C22.3 No.60826-10 Design criteria for overhead transmission lines.* Mississauga, ON: Canadian Standards Association.

Eaton. (2014, August). *Eaton helps Portland General Electric make Tomorrow's Smart Grid a Reality*. Retrieved January 9, 2015, from www.eaton.com/ecm/groups/public/@pub/@electrical/documents/content/cs083022en.pdf

Engineers Canada. (2012). *Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Committee (PIEVC): Engineering Protocol.* Ottawa, ON: Canadian Council of Profession Engineers.

IEC-60287. (n.d.). Electric Cables - Calculation of the current rating. Switzerland.

IEEE Std C57.12.24. (2009). Submersible, Three-Phase Transformers, 3750 kVA and Smaller: High Voltage, 34 500GrdY/19 920 Volts and Below; Low Voltage, 600 Volts and Below. New York, NY, USA.

IEEE-Std_C57.91. (2012, March 7). IEEE Guide for Loading Mineral-Oil-Immersed Transformers and Step-Voltage Regulators. New York, New York, Unitated States.

IEEE-Std-485. (1997). Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications. New York, New York, United States.

Klaassen, J., Cheng, S., Auld, H., Li, Q., Ros, E., Geast, M., et al. (2003). *Estimation of Severe Ice Storm Risk for South-Central Canada.* Downsview (Toronto), Ontario: Meteorological Service of Canada - Ontario Region, Environment Canada.

Kunkel, K. E., Karl, T. R., Brooks, H., Kossin, J., Lawrimore, J. H., Arndt, D., et al. (2013, April). Monitoring and Understanding Trends in Extreme Storms: State of Knowledge. *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*, pp. 499-514.

Lombardo, F. T., Main, J. A., & Simiu, E. (2009). Automated extraction and classification of thunderstorm and non-thunderstorm wind data for extreme-value analysis. *Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics, 97*(3-4), 120-131.

McDonald, J. R., & Mehta, K. (2006). *Recommendation for an Enhanced Fujita Scale.* Lubbock, Texas: Wind Science and Engineering Center, Texas Tech University.

McEvoy, D., Ahmed, I., & Mullett, J. (2012). The impact of the 2009 heat wave on Melbourne's critical infrastructure. *Local Environment, 17*(8), 783-796.

Navigant Consulting Ltd. (2011). *Toronto Hydro System Connection Capacity and Enabling Options for Distributed Generation.* Toronto: Toronto Hydro.

NEETRAC. (2010). *Diagnostic Testing of Underground Cable Systems.* Retrieved 2014, from Georgia Tech: http://www.cdfi.gatech.edu/publications/Pages_from_CDFI_Phase_Final_Report-2.0.pdf

Nema standard. (n.d.). *Nema standards*. Retrieved from The Association of Electrical Equipment and Medical Imaging Manufacturers: http://www.nema.org/

PJM Overhead conductor Ad Hoc Committee. (2010). *Bare overhead transmission conductor ratings.* Retrieved from PJM: www.pjm.com

Romps, D. M., Seeley, J. T., Vollaro, D., & Molinar, J. (2014). Projected Increase in Lightning Strikes in the United States due to global warming. *Science*(346), 851-854.

S&C manufacturer. (2011). SCADA-Mate CXtm Switching System, Information Sheet 768-452.

Statistics Canada. (2014). *Census Profile*. Retrieved December 16, 2014, from http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=3520005&Geo2=CD&Code2=3520&Data=Count&SearchText=toronto&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=35&B1=All&Custom=&TABID=1

Toronto Hydro. (2007). Toronto Hydro Distribution System Planning Guidelines. Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

Toronto Hydro. (2011). *EB-2011-0144, Exhibit D1.* Retrieved from Toronto Hydro: http://www.torontohydro.com/sites/electricsystem/documents/2012edr/d1_t09_s03.pdf

Toronto Hydro. (2012). *Corporate Responsibility Report.* Toronto, ON, CA: Toronto Hydro Corporation.

Toronto Hydro. (2013). *Annual Report - 2013 Environmental Performance.* Toronto.

Toronto Hydro. (2014a). *Overview of the Operating, Maintenance and Administration (OM&A) Expenditures.* Toronto.

Toronto Hydro. (2014b). *Facts at a Glance*. Retrieved May 29, 2015, from www.torontohydro.com/sites/corporate/AboutUs/Pages/FactsataGlance.aspx

Toronto Hydro. (2014c). *Distribution System Plan 2015-2019.* Toronto: Toronto Hydro.

Toronto Hydro. (2014d). Overview of the Toronto Area Transmission Systems and Toronto Hydro Distribution Systems. (Power point 121 p.). Toronto.

TRCA, T. R. (2014). *Meteorological data provided July 2014, J. Duncan.* Toronto, ON: Toronto Conservation Authority.

Appendix A
Workshop Presentations

Appendix B
Background Information on Developing Climate Data

Appendix C
Forensic Analysis of Weather Related Power Outage Events

Appendix D
Risk Assessment Matrix

Appendix E
Risk Maps

Appendix F
Load Projection Methodology – Toronto Hydro

Appendix G
Engineering Analysis

Appendix H
PIEVC Worksheets

AECOM
85 Sainte-Catherine Street West
Montréal, Québec, Canada H2X 3P4
T 514 287 8500
F 514 287 8600
www.aecom.com